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INTRODUCTION
t has been just over thirty years since Kentucky became one of the
first American jurisdictions to formally reject vested rights' as its
methodology for making choices of law, moving forward from that
point into anew era of conflicts jurisprudence, free from the rigid strictures
of the past. In that period, Kentucky state court appellate decisions have
attempted to flesh out the methodology to be appliedin the commonwealth.
Federal trial courts and appellate courts, primarily in Kentucky or the Sixth
Circuit but occasionally in other federal jurisdictions, have added their own
interpretations of the Kentucky conflicts rules. What has emerged is far
from a clear picture of the status of Kentucky choice of law, and that
unclear picture is well exemplified by federal attempts to apply Kentucky
law. The purpose of this Article is primarily descriptive: to compile the
existing state and federal case law, organized into categories; to assist the
Kentucky bench and bar in understanding the current state of affairs; and
to make future choices. Before beginning the journey forward, it seems in
order to take a brief look at Kentucky's status prior to this modem era.
'For a detailed discussion of"vested rights"jurisprudence, see infra notes 2-16
and accompanying text.
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I. CHOICE OF LAW PRIOR TO 1967
Prior to 1967, Kentucky (like virtually every other American jurisdic-
tion) used vested rights as its conflicts or choice of law methodology.2
Vested rights was the system embodied in the First Restatement of
Conflicts,3 the brainchild of Joseph Beale. As a body ofjurisprudence, it
was typical of the rigid, territorialist thinking prevalent prior to the turn of
this century. In addressing the issue of legislative jurisdiction,4 the system
was the counterpart of the rigid control ofjudicial jurisdiction5 embodied
in Pennoyer v. Neff.
The First Restatement functioned simplistically. Legal issues were
identified, typically by characterization. Thus, one species of tort case was
wrongful death, one species of contract case was excuses for nonperfor-
mance, etc. Once an issue had been characterized, specific sections of the
First Restatement identified which jurisdiction's law controlled. Thus, a
wrongful death claim was governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which
the injury causing the death occurred.7 Contract issues were a bit more
complex, with the law of the place of the making of the contract controlling
"validity" issues8 and the law of the place of performance controlling
"performance" issues.9
The central focus of vested rights was on territorial and temporal
vesting. Thus, the rights and liabilities of parties involved in an automobile
accident vested territorially in the jurisdiction where the accident occurred
and vested temporally as well. It was thereafter the duty of any forum with
judicial jurisdiction to enforce those previously vested rights, hence the
name of the system. Vested rights was also conceptually rigid in that it was
2 
"Conflict of Laws is that part of the law of each state which determines what
effect is given to the fact that the case may have a significant relationship to more
than one state." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (1971).
3 See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAwS (1934).
' As used in this Article, "legislative jurisdiction" is the ability of a state or
country to control the outcome of a controversy on the merits.
5 As used in this Article, "judicial jurisdiction" is the ability of a state or country
to serve as a forum for the litigation of a controversy.
6 Permoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), overruled inpart by Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
7 See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-383. It was this application
of the law of the place of the injury which gave rise to the system being frequently
referred to as adopting the "lex loci" rule for torts.
8See id. § 332.
9 See id. § 358.
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a "jurisdiction selecting" approach. That is, all the substantive rights and
liabilities of the parties were governed by the state identified by reference
to the appropriate choice of law rule. 0 The methodology was obviously
more suited to the simplistic pleading and joinder provisions of common
law or code systems, with their restrictions resulting in more narrow
litigation than modem procedural systems.
By the 1960s, the vested rights doctrine was under severe academic
criticism. The Second Restatement" had been in draft stages since prior to
1950 and scholars such as Robert Leflar 2 and Brainerd Currie 3 had
proposed alternative systems for making choices of law. Quite apart from
its academic criticism, vestedrights was also crumbling underthe tendency
of courts to avoid the choices which at first blush appeared dictated by the
First Restatement. Thus, seemingly clear results were avoided by such
devices as characterization" or public policy veto. 5 Unable to resist what
" The procedural issues involved in litigation were governed by the law of the
forum. See id. § 585. To the extent that obvious difficulties exist in differentiating
"substantive" from "procedural" issues, the system was doomed to struggle with
issues falling into the "twilight zone," wherein rules of law are somewhat
substantive and somewhat procedural.
" Professor Willis L.M. Reese was the Reporter and primary architect of this
monumental work.
12 See ROBERTA. LEFLARETAL.,AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 4 (4th ed. 1986)
("Ultimately, the basic choice-influencing considerations have to be identified and
some system worked out for deliberately basing choice of law decisions upon
intelligent analysis of those considerations.").
13 See BRAINERD CURRIE, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 3, 75 (1964) (stating that "the
normal expectation should be that the rule of decision will be supplied by the
domestic law as a matter of course" and that "[t]he court should ordinarily depart
from this procedure only at the instance of a party wishing to obtain the advantage
of a foreign law").
14See, e.g., Alabama Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 804 (Ala. 1892)
(manipulating a seemingly obvious tort action by determining that the tort occurred
in some state other than where the accident physically occurred); Grant v.
McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 946 (Cal. 1953) (holding that a seeming tort issue was
really a procedural matter requiring application of the law of the forum); Levy v.
Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163, 164 (Conn. 1928) (holding that
a seeming tort issue was really a contract issue).
"5 This was a device which allowed a forum to refuse to apply the law which
was dictated by its conflicts rules upon the grounds that application of that sister
state's law was contrary to the public policy of the forum. See, e.g., Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527-28 (N.Y. 1961).
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had become the overwhelming weight of both scholarly and judicial
opinion, vested rights began to crumble in the mid-1960s as courts chose
to abandon the pretensions and sophistry of prior manipulations in favor of
the various choice of law systems academically proposed.
Prior to 1967, Kentucky was firmly committed to vested rights as its
choice of law methodology.16 At that point, Kentucky, faced with a classic
fact pattern which revealed the shortcomings of vested rights as a conflicts
system, chose to begin its departure from that prior choice of law system.
If. KENTUCKY DEPARTS FROM VESTED RIGHTS
In the 1967 decision Wessling v. Paris,17 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals was confronted with what would have been a very clear choice of
law question for vested rights courts. A Kentucky resident,'8 while a
passenger in an automobile driven by a Kentucky resident, was injured in
an accident in Indiana during a trip which began and was to have ended in
Kentucky. The passenger brought suit in Kentucky, personal jurisdiction
over the driver being clearly available since she was a Kentucky resident."9
Historically, the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties would have
been governed by Indiana law since that was the place of the accident.
Noting, however, that "no conflict of laws authority today agrees that the
old rule shall be retained," the court of appeals applied Kentucky law to
avoid the impact the Indiana guest statute 0 would have had upon the
passenger's ability to recover.2' Fearing the uncertainty that abandonment
of vested rights might pose, the court chose to "limit the application of the
rule to a very clear case, such as we have here. All of the interests involved
(other than the fortuitous place of the accident) [were] Kentucky
16 See, e.g., Ansback v. Greensberg, 256 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1952) (applying the
lex loci rule to an automobile accident case). All Kentucky conflicts decisional law
prior to 1967 is consistent with application of the First Restatement.
'7 Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
18 Choice of law cases have long used the state of a party's domicile as an
important connecting factor in making choice of law decisions. For purposes of this
consideration, "resident" may be considered synonymous with "domiciliary."
'9 See Wessling, 417 S.W.2d at 259.
20 A guest statute is a limitation upon the liability that the driver of a vehicle
owes to passengers in that vehicle. Typically, a guest statute provides that the
host/driver is not liable to the guest/passenger unless a heightened showing of
negligence (i.e., "gross" or "willful and wanton") can be made.
21 Wessling, 417 S.W.2d at 260.
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interests."' Amazingly, an identical "clear case" was before the court of
appeals within six months and the matter was held, as in Wessling, to be
governed by Kentucky law rather than the Indiana guest statute.2
The decision in Wesslingwas correct under any of the successor choice
of law systems because, in the analysis of Professor Currie, the facts were
easily identifiable as a false conflict.24 Kentucky had an obvious interest in
seeing the Kentucky-domiciled passenger compensated, regardless of the
location of the injury, and Indiana's guest statute had no sensible applica-
tion to protect a non-Indiana driver operating a motor vehicle which was
registered and insured in Kentucky.2" Indeed, the facts were so easy that the
decision reached (in and of itself) gave no insight as to what would be
Kentucky's successor to vested rights as a choice of law methodology.
The opinion contained, at various points, references to virtually every
scholarly camp of the critics of vested rights.26 In what was the beginning
of a pattern for torts cases, the court paid more than passing deference to
the role of forum law, noting that "there is no other requirement that the
law of a foreign state be applied in the local forum except the adopted
policy of such forum."27 With such conflicting references to possible
theoretical justifications, the outcome was a result which could have been
justified under any of the suggested successors to vested rights, providing
no insight into more difficult issues and even suggesting that vested rights
might remain the methodology except for "very clear cases." Such an
illusion of limitation was soon shattered, but the mystery of the methodol-
ogy was not.
22Id. at 261.
"See Story v. Burgess, 420 S.W.2d 548, 548 (Ky. 1967).24See generally CURRIE, supra note 13.
25 The court noted that "[w]hile it might be said that Indiana has a policy of
protecting drivers on their highways from claims by passengers, surely this must
extend no further than an interest in protecting Indiana residents or those who sue
in Indiana courts." Wessling, 417 S.W.2d at 260.
26 The Second Restatement was specifically referenced. See id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379(a) (Tentative Draft No. 9,
1964)). A footnote to the opinion also contained references to the works of Dicey,
Leflar, Stumberg, Morris, and Ehrenzweig. See id. at 260 n.1. Perhaps Professor
Cavers should feel slighted at having been omitted, but the most significant
omission is of Brainerd Currie since his seminal work is the source of the false
conflicts analysis.
27 Id. at 260. This echoes the "local law theory" philosophy behind the works
of Judge Learned Hand and Professor Walter Wheeler Cook. See David F. Cavers,
The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARV. L. REV. 822 (1950).
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Within a year of Wessling, the court was confronted in Arnett v.
Thompson28 with the mirror image ofthe Wessling facts. InArnett, the Ohio
husband-driver of an automobile was sued in Kentucky by his Ohio wife-
passenger, who had been injured in an automobile accident in Kentucky.2 9
Had the litigation occurred in Ohio, the wife would have faced barriers to
recovery both from the Ohio guest statute and from that state's common
law rule ofinterspousal immunity.30 Kentucky had no guest statute and had
overruled the common law rule of immunity, so that it was possible for the
wife to recover 1 The result in a Kentucky forum would have been easily
discernible prior to Wessling, Kentucky was the situs of the accident and
so its law would govern to allow the wife to recover.32 The departure from
vested rights in Wessling, however, led the husband (or, more likely, his
insurer) to argue that Ohio law should govern.33
The appeal of such an argument is obvious. The result in Wesslingwas
that the law of the domicile of the parties controlled, so that application of
a similar principle in Arnett would result in application of Ohio law. Such
an argument overlooks one crucial fact: while the fact patterns are the
mirror image of each other, the law patterns are not, andKentucky remains
the forum in both. In the parlance of interest analysis, it has long been
assumed that Arnett presented a true conflict. Surely the policies of Ohio
to protect its drivers from ungrateful guests andto protect spouses from the
domestic intranquility of litigation applied to the parties who were
domiciled in Ohio. More difficult to identify is the Kentucky interest in
these facts. One may at least argue that Kentucky's liability-orientedpolicy
was directed toward compensation of tort victims and, perhaps, deterrence
oftortfeasors. Both such policies would be furthered by applying Kentucky
law to an accident occurring in Kentucky, regardless of the domicile of the
tort victim or the tortfeasor. Kentucky, as the place of the accident, was the
key to activation of such a policy.
After reviewing various conflicts authorities, virtually all of which
would have applied Ohio law,34 the court concluded that it would apply
2 Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
29 Seeid. at 112.
30 See id.
31 See id. at 113.
32 Seeid. at 112.
33 See id.
I Professor Reese, Reporter for the Second Restatement, later confirmed that
Ohio law was the correct result for Arnett. See Willis L.M. Reese, The Kentucky
Approach to Choice ofLaw: A Critique, 61 KY. L.J. 368, 373 (1973).
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Kentucky law.35 Seeming to expressly reject any aspect of "weighing" of
contacts which might be implicit in the Second Restatement, the court
stated that "the conflicts question should not be determined on the basis of
a weighing of interests, but simply on the basis of whether Kentucky has
enough contacts to justify applying Kentucky law."'36 Almost simulta-
neously, the court of appeals directed application of Kentucky law to a
virtually identical Kentucky accident case where the litigants (husband-
driver and wife-passenger) were from Indiana.37
As had been the case in Wessling, the Arnett decision mentioned in
passing a number of conflict of laws authorities.3 8 It must be taken that, as
possible successors to vested rights in Kentucky, most of those were
implicitly rejected by the result in Arnett. Realistically, the holding in a
decision is the result on the material facts, and one must pay at least equal
attention to what a decision does as to what it says. Looking at the result in
Arnett, one can easily see that a choice of forum law has occurred in what
is at best a true conflict fact pattern in which most of the prominent
academic rivals would have chosen Ohio law. Indeed, the only major body
of jurisprudence which would support the choice of Kentucky law is that
of Brainerd Currie, who theorized that in a true conflict situation the duty
of the forum was to apply its own law.39 Surely the language in Arnett
about applying Kentucky law if there are "sufficient" contacts echoes the
Currie analysis that a forum should apply its own law when it has due
process sufficient connections, although the due process sufficiency of
Kentucky's contacts may be more problematical than one might think at
first glance.
The pattern of application of Kentucky law whenever possible
continued in the final installment of the modem Kentucky state court tort
choice of law cases, Foster v. Leggett.' There, a Kentucky resident was a
passenger in an Ohio-registered and -insured vehicle driven by an Ohio
35See Arnett, 433 S.W.2d at 114.36 Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
37 See Layne v. Layne, 433 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1968).
38 SeeArnett, 433 S.W.2d at 113 (noting that many authorities were mentioned
in a Wessling footnote and also discussing the ideas of Judge Charles and Professor
Sedler).39 See CURRIE, supra note 13, at 75. But cf. BRAINERD CURRIE, Justice Traynor
and the Conflict ofLaws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra
note 13, at 629, 688-89 n.236 (noting that at times it is preferable to define
domestic interests with "restraints and moderation").
4 Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
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domiciliary who was employed in Kentucky and kept a room rented full-
time in Kentucky, staying there on average two nights per week. The
passenger was killed in an accident in Ohio and suit was brought in
Kentucky, being met with a defense based upon the Ohio guest statute.4'
The difficulty of Kentucky applying its law to the merits of the litigation
can easily be seen just by considering the personal jurisdiction problem
which leaps from the facts. No stretch of the Kentucky long arm statute
would have allowedpersonaljurisdiction over the Ohio resident for a claim
arising from an accident in Ohio 2 But for the fortunate circumstance of
personal service upon the defendant while physically present in Kentucky,
there would have been no personal jurisdiction. Once one perceives the
virtual unavailability ofjudicial jurisdiction, it can clearly be seen that an
exercise of legislative jurisdiction (i.e., application of Kentucky law to the
merits) was a difficult proposition.
Revisiting Wessling and Arnett, the court noted that some might read
those decisions to indicate that Kentucky utilized the "most significant
contacts" analysis to apply Kentucky law to accidents in other states
(Wessling) and the "sufficient contacts" analysis to apply Kentucky law to
accidents in Kentucky (Arnett). The court expressly disclaimed any
intention to do so.43 Noting again its desire to apply Kentucky law
whenever Kentucky had "significant contacts-not necessarily the most
significant contacts," the court proceeded to apply Kentucky law.44 Again
without citing any scholarly authority, the court stated that "[w]hen the
court has jurisdiction of the parties its primary responsibility is to follow
its own substantive law. The basic law is the law of the forum, which
should not be displaced without valid reasons."
The decision may not contain scholarly citations, but surely that view
of the role of the court in choosing forum law whenever possible is pure
Brainerd Currie.' Indeed, the pattern of Wessling, Arnett, and Foster is
classic Currie: one false conflict with only forum policies implicated and
two true conflicts47 all lead to the same result, which is application of
4 1 See id. at 827-28.
42 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 454.2 10 (Michie 1968).
43 See Foster, 484 S.W.2d at 829.
44Id.
45 Id.
46 See CURRIE, supra note 13, at 75.
47 Foster is a true conflict because Kentucky has an interest in seeing the
survivors of its domiciliary compensated for her death, wherever it occurred. Ohio
law has an interest because its guest statute would serve to protect both its
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forum law. Indeed, the criticism oftheFosterresult inthe dissent of Justice
Reed echoes the classic criticism of Currie's choice of law system: that it
encourages forum shopping, an easily indulged pastime in the era of
modem long arm jurisdiction.48 In a very real sense, Currie's pro-forum
system (brilliant as it may be in its theoretical analysis) actually balkanizes
choice of law and is the antithesis of a true choice of law system because
its result is automatic and mindless in the only fact pattern worth decid-
ing-the true conflict.
Whatever one may think of the intellectual soundness of the group, this
trilogy of Kentucky Court of Appeals tort conflicts decisions sets the stage
for the modem choice of law era in Kentucky. Their language and results
cast shadows throughout both Kentucky's non-tort conflicts cases and the
federal cases which have attempted to apply Kentucky's choice of law
rules.
A. The Contracts Experience ofKentucky
After all the major Kentucky tort choice of law cases in the modem era
had been decided, the Kentucky Supreme Court was confronted with fact
patterns requiring a choice of law on contract issues. Surprisingly, the
treatment of those cases was (on the surface at least) far different from that
afforded the tort cases.
In 1977, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed issues relating to
uninsured motorist coverage under an automobile insurance policy inLewis
v. American Family Insurance Group.49 The Indiana-domiciled driver and
passenger of a vehicle which was registered and insured in Indiana were
involved in an accident in Kentucky with a vehicle driven by a Kentucky-
domiciled uninsured driver. They filed suit in Kentucky against the
uninsured driver and American Family Insurance Group, which allegedly
had uninsured motorist liability on two separate policies applicable to the
vehicle in which they were riding. The decision lacks discussion as to
whether there was in fact any difference between the law of Indiana and
Kentucky regarding liability under the two policies but proceeds to apply
Indiana law.5"
Prior to Lewis, there was Kentucky authority for the proposition that
Indiana law should have governed, with that authority coming from the
domiciliary driver and his insurer.
48 See Foster, 484 S.W.2d at 830-31 (Reed, J., dissenting).
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vested rights result in cases like Fry Bros. v. Theobold 1 That would have
been a standard result in the vested rights era since such disputes were
governed under the FirstRestatement by the law of the place of the making
of the contract. 2 In Lewis, the court stated that "[s]uch a mechanical
approach is no longer favored."'53 The court cited with favor the "most
significant relationship test" of the Second Restatement and, in particular,
that section of the Second Restatement applicable to insurance contracts.54
Based upon the conclusion that Indiana had the most significant relation-
ship, its law was applied.5
In fact, there were some modem era cases supporting the result in
Lewis, one of which was cited by the court56 and one of which was not. 7
Although decided in the modem era of conflicts in Kentucky, neither of
those cases had cited even the slightest authority for their conclusion that
the law of states other than Kentucky applied to the fact patterns. Given the
propensity for Kentucky law evident from the tort cases, the failure to
apply Kentucky law is surprising. Indeed, most surprising about those two
cases and Lewis is that all three reach a result quite unlike the tort
predecessors-they apply the law of another state to the merits even though
Kentucky had judicial jurisdiction.
That result is less surprising, however, when one considers that what
is conspicuously absent from Lewis is even a hint that the policy of any
state other than Indiana was implicated in the dispute. With no identifica-
tion of Kentucky law having been different from Indiana's, one cannot
even conclude for certain that there was a conflict in the two states' laws.
Thus, it is difficult to verify that Indiana had the most significant relation-
ship when no one else's relationship appears to have had any bearing on the
case. In reviewing the result, one must recall that the dispute was not
between the uninsured Kentucky driver and the Indiana residents but was
merely between those Indiana residents and their own insurer.58 It is
difficult to see how Kentucky could have had any interest in those facts.
5' Fry Bros. v. Theobold, 265 S.W. 498 (Ky. 1924).
52 See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934).
53Lewis, 555 S.W.2d at 581.
54 See id. at 582 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193
(1971)).55 See id.
" See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Napier, 505 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. 1974).
17 See Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d
843 (Ky. 1977).58See Lewis, 555 S.W.2d at 581.
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The lack of a Kentucky interest is so dramatic, indeed, that any attempt to
apply Kentucky law to affect the outcome of the litigation on the merits
almost certainly would have violated due process.59 Viewedthusly, the case
talks approvingly of the Second Restatement but may actually present a
false conflict in which Indiana is the only interested jurisdiction. Applica-
tion of Indiana law under those circumstances is almost certainly the
correct result. The language in Lewis being so different from that in the tort
cases, however, presents some difficulties for analyzingKentucky law. The
case does stand for the clear proposition (as to contract cases, at least) that
Kentucky will not invariably apply its own law simply because it has
judicial jurisdiction.
The issue of the absence of a Kentucky interest was not posed in
Breeding v. Massachusetts Indemnity and Life Insurance Co.,' in which
Kentucky law was applied to a dispute arising from the death of a
Kentucky domiciliary in Kentucky. In Breeding, the decedent had rented
a vehicle from a Budget auto rental franchisee in Louisville. Along with the
auto rental, the decedent purchased a policy for accidental death which
provided coverage for an accidental death during the term of the rental
whether or not related to the auto rental. The decedent then drowned in
Kentucky, his death having been at least partially related to intoxication."
The master policy, which had been issued to Budget's franchiser in
Delaware, contained both a choice of law clause in favor of Delaware law
and an exclusion of coverage for any death "'caused directly or indirectly
by... intoxicants."' 6 Without addressing the problem posed by the choice
of law clause,63 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that Kentucky law
applied to override the exclusion because the decedent had not, as required
" There is authority in the form of a plurality opinion of the United States
Supreme Court that a state may constitutionally apply its own rule in such a
circumstance. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981). Even that
tenuous position, however, was founded upon two factual connections not present
in Lewis: the forum as the place of employment of the injured party and a post-
accident move to the forum by the claiming party. See id. at 304. Given the
narrowness of the opinion when those grounds were present, I conclude that an
attempt to apply forum law in the absence of such connections would be violative
of due process.
6 Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.
1982).61Seeid. at 718.62Id. (quoting policy language).
63 As will be seen infra, that sub silentio invalidation of the choice of law clause
has not gone unnoticed in other Kentucky cases.
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by Kentucky statute,' been supplied with a copy of the policy which
notified him of the exclusion. 6
In reaching its decision, the supreme court (as it had in the prior tort
cases and Lewis) recognized that mechanical deference to the law of the
place of the delivery of the policy (which would have been the vested rights
position) was no longer desirable. Rather, the court found that the choice
of law should be based upon the "grouping of contacts doctrine," with
reference specifically to the Second Restatement.' That methodology
identified, the court then observed that Delaware did not have a significant
relationship to the parties orthe transaction but had "one that [was] tenuous
at best.16' Kentucky had the most significant relationship to insurance
"purchased in Kentucky by a Kentucky resident from a Kentucky
corporation" giving rise to a claim generated by that resident's death in
Kentucky.68
As with Lewis, the result is unquestionable. Again, however, it is far
from clear that there was even a conflict. While Delaware law did not
require that a copy of the policy be delivered to the insured to effectuate an
exclusion,69 it appears that the master policy itself provided that such
notification of coverage "'shall be deliveredto each insured."'7 0 Surelythe
duties of the insurer independently assumed by its own contract would
prevail over the minimum requirements of Delaware statutes. Thus, the
case could be characterized as a false conflict in which Kentucky was the
only interested state or in which there was no different result posed by the
law of the two states.
The modem era contract cases pose an interesting counterpoint to the
modem era tort cases. The multiple references to the Second Restatement
in Breeding appear to differ dramatically from the apparently straightfor-
ward rejection of the Second Restatement in Arnett and Foster. Further-
more, the application of non-Kentucky law in Lewis stands out dramati-
cally. Nowhere do the contract cases echo the forum-oriented language
seen in the tort cases or proclaim a desire to apply Kentucky law based on
"sufficient" rather than "significant" contacts.
64 See K.R.S. § 304.18-080(2) (Michie 1970).6s See Breeding, 633 S.W.2d at 720.
66 See id. at 719.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3542 (1953).
70Breeding, 633 S.W.2d at 718 (quoting policy language).
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While the language may differ, the contracts cases are similar to the
tort cases in one highly important respect: Kentucky law was not applied
in the face of what was clearly a false conflict (Lewis) and it is possible to
view evenBreedingas a false conflictwith only Kentucky interested. Thus,
the pattern may be the same: application of Kentucky law in every case in
which there were sufficient contacts to do so. If one cares to make the issue
more complicated and state that Breeding was a true conflict, still the
pattern was not broken because the choice was to apply Kentucky law.
Thus, one may look at what the cases (tort and contract) do, rather than
what they say, to observe that Kentucky is choosing to apply its own law
in every case in which it has an interest, even if it is not necessarily the
most significant interest. Surely that is a result more theoretically
attributable to Brainerd Currie than to the Second Restatement.7 Despite
that clear pattern, however, the Second Restatement language in the
contract cases has served as a departure point for Kentucky choice of law
decisions over the years.
The major modem era conflicts cases from the Kentucky Supreme
Court thus appear themselves to display a "conflict" in language if not in
result: the tort cases on their surface reject SecondRestatementterminology
in favor of what appears to be a Currie, due process-based approach; the
contract cases cite approvingly to Second Restatement language but reach
results which could be justified under the "sufficient contacts" analysis of
the tort cases. Perhaps a better clue to what is going on in the choice of law
methodology can be found in the other decisions by Kentucky's supreme
court and court of appeals on other conflicts issues.
B. Decisional Developments After the First Wave ofModern Cases
Before attempting to discern a pattern from the modem Kentucky
choice of law cases, it is to be hopedthat the system shares a common trait
of modem systems: that it is an "issue selecting" approach rather than a
"jurisdiction selecting" approach as was vested rights. The simple
difference between the two is that a modem choice may result in the law
of one state controlling one issue in a case and the law of another state
controlling some other, but still "substantive," issue. This "issue selecting"
phenomenon is known by conflicts scholars as "depecage," T but there is no
evidence in the Kentucky state court experience to demonstrate that
Kentucky's system encompasses it. There is an instance in the federal
71 See CURRIE, supra note 13, at 75.72See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 436 (6th ed. 1990).
[VOL. 87
CHOICE OF LAW IN KENTUCKY
system of such a duality of controls,7 and one must assume that such an
approach will prevail in the state courts as well.
1. Choice ofForum Clauses
Any conflicts case has, by definition, elements which cut across state
or national boundaries. Thus, it is not unusual to see conflicts cases involve
personal jurisdiction disputes as a threshold matter. In an attempt to solve
that uncertainty, parties to written contracts will often insert "choice of
forum clauses" by which a particular state is chosen as an appropriate
forum for litigation of any disputes which may arise. The language of such
clauses may vary, occasionally being couched in terms of an agreement
that a particular state is the appropriate "venue" for litigation or that the
parties submit themselves to the personal jurisdiction of a particular state.
Occasionally, a particularly well drafted clause may use the artful
terminology that the parties designate a particular state as the exclusive
forum for any such disputes. In whatever format, such clauses cause the
forum (whether the designated one or a nondesignated one to which a
reluctant party has taken the litigation) to initially determine the clauses'
validity.
Kentucky's court of appeals faced such a clause in Prudential
Resources Corp. v. Plunkett.7 4 In PrudentialResources, a contracting party
had ignored a forum selection clause in favor of Texas and hadbrought suit
in Kentucky. The dispute involved the validity of an option to purchase a
mineral lease to real property located in Kentucky.75 Kentucky (as the situs
ofthe property) was an available forum, but the issue was whether it should
so serve in view of a forum selection designating Texas as the proper
forum. The court of appeals began by resolving any doubts as to whether
a forum selection clause ousted Kentucky of jurisdiction to even address
any dispute between the parties. Citing the Second Restatement, the court
held that such clauses did not oust other, nondesignated forums of
jurisdiction. 6 The court further noted, however, that the Second Restate-
ment mandated enforcement of such a clause unless "it is unfair or
73 See Tractor & Farm Supply, Inc. v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 898 F. Supp.
1198, 1202-03 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
74 Prudential Resources Corp. v. Plunkett, 583 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
75 See id. at 98.




unreasonable."" Since it appeared that none of the facts relating to
negotiation and execution of the contract occurred in Kentucky, that one of
the parties to the contract was a Texas resident, that the other party
maintained offices in Texas, that there was no "overreaching" by either
party, but that the agreement was the result of "arms length" bargaining,
the court concluded that it was neither unfair nor unreasonable to enforce
the clause as written. The action was thus dismissed to be refiled in
Texas.78 While upholding the clause based on SecondRestatement analysis,
it is worthwhile to note that the court found that "Kentucky [had] a minimal
interest in this lawsuit. '7 9
A similar situation confronted the Kentucky Supreme Court almost
twenty years later in Prezocki v. Bullock Garages, Inc.80 The Prezockis,
who were residents of Kentucky, contracted with Bullock Garages
(presumably a nonresident corporation) for construction, apparently in
Kentucky, of a garage. Their form contract contained a choice of forum
clause in favor of Illinois. The Prezockis filed suit in district court in
Kentucky, butthe action was dismissedpursuantto Bullock's motion based
on the forum selection clause. Reiterating the prior reliance of Kentucky's
court of appeals on section 80 of the Second Restatement, the supreme
court noted that the record was insufficiently developed for a court to have
decided whether enforcement of the clause would be unfair or unreason-
able.81 The case was remanded to develop a factual record on which to
judge whether the clause was unfair or unreasonable. 2
Given the consumer-driven nature of the facts and the inclusion of the
clause in what was apparently a form contract, it is certainly possible that
an ultimate determination of unfairness to the Kentucky residents could
have been made. Harking back to language in Prudential, one may also
speculate that Kentucky's interest in applying its own law to allow
recovery for its damaged residents arising from Kentucky conduct was
likely to play a role in the ultimate outcome as well. For purposes of
analysis of Kentucky's choice of law system, Prezocki (like Prudential)
indicates a reliance upon the Second Restatement and serves notice that
forum selection clauses do not invariably result in enforcement of the
selection.
77Id.
78 See id. at 100.
79 Id.
80Prezocki v. Bullock Garages, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1997).
81See id. at 889.
82 See id. at 888-89.
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2. Choice ofLaw Clauses
Similar in effect to (and often confused with) choice of forum clauses
are choice of law clauses, which provide that in whatever forum, disputes
between the parties will be governed by the law of a chosen jurisdiction.
Indeed, it is not unusual to see contractual documents which contain both
a choice of forum clause and a choice of law clause, occasionally combined
into a single clause. A carefully drafted clause will normally state that
disputes are governed by the internal, municipal, or local law of the chosen
jurisdiction in order to avoid a reference to the "whole" law of the chosen
state, with its inherent renvoi83 possibilities, although the Second Restate-
ment indicates that such a clause which lacks definition of the extent of law
chosen will normally be limited to the chosen forum's local law.84 The
effect of a choice of law clause is to avoid the necessity of making a
choice, deferring to the parties' contractually chosen law.
Typical of such clauses was the provision enforced by the Kentucky
Supreme Court inFite & Warmath Construction Co. v. MYS Corp.5 There,
a Tennessee contractor entered into a contract in New York with a
Kentucky corporation, the principal place of business for which was New
York, for construction of a shopping mall in Kentucky.86 The contract
contained a choice of law clause in favor of Kentucky law. After a dispute
over issues arising during construction, the owner sought arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the contract. 88 Without
discussion, the supreme court proceeded to apply Kentucky (and federal)
law to the request notwithstanding that the traditional choice of law would
most likely have been New York law (place of making of the contract) but
83 "Renvoi," or reference back, occurs when a forum chooses to determine a
case exactly as would a court in the state whose law is chosen. That will mean that
the reference to the other state includes its conflicts rules (the only distinction
between its whole law and its local law). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (6th
ed. 1990). It is not impossible, given disparity of choice of law methodologies, to
find that the referred-to state would not choose to apply its own law but would
choose to apply the law of the forum. This is typically avoided by having a
reference to sister state law be only to its local law, thus avoiding the reference
back possibility.84See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(3) (1971).
85Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1977).





for the clause.89 Ultimately, the court concluded that the arbitration clause
was required to be honored pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act,90 which
governed contracts involving interstate commerce. 1 Noting that Kentucky
had its own statutory arbitration provisions,92 the court specifically noted
that it was not "displacing a viable public policy of" Kentucky. 3
Before tuning to other choice of law clause cases, it is worthwhile to
note that Kentucky in Fite & Warmath upheld a clause which chose
Kentucky law. A clause choosing the law of another state poses quite a
different view of the forum-oriented pattern previously observed in the
modem Kentucky conflicts cases. In such a case, however, the result should
not vary because the control as to contracts involving interstate commerce
would be federal law rather than state conflicts law.94
In General Electric Co. v. Martin,9' the court of appeals was facedwith
a fact pattern involving whether a Kentucky resident who had been
employed by General Electric in Kentucky was entitled to disability
benefits denied by that company's pension plan administrator.96 The
resident, who had a third grade education and worked for the company for
twenty-two years, had (early in her employment) applied to participate in
the General Electric pension plan. The plan contained a choice of law
clause in favor of New York law. Although the parties attempted to
demonstrate a difference between the law of New York and that of
Kentucky as it related to the case at hand, the court of appeals found "no
significant difference between the law of the two states." 97 Thus, the case
appears to have presented a false conflict, with no real reason to determine
whether the choice of law clause was valid. Despite that fact, the court
89 See id.
90 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947).
91 See Fite & Warmath, 559 S.W.2d at 734.
9 See id. (citing K.R.S. § 417.010-.018 (1953) (repealed 1984)).
93Id.
' This should not be taken to mean that all contract cases involving interstate
commerce are governedby federal law. Rather, those containing arbitration clauses
are required by the Federal Arbitration Act to be arbitrated absent an effective
waiver by the parties.
95 General Elec. Co. v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
96It should be noted that such a piece of litigation today would be governed by
federal law because it was a dispute involving a benefit plan provided to the
employee by her employer. Such claims are governed now by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1974).
97 General Elec. Co., 574 S.W.2d at 316 n.1.
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observed that the provision was valid, citing to a 1948 Kentucky case and
the SecondRestatement.98 Again, however, it is worth noting that Kentucky
was not asked to defer to another state's law in a situation where Kentucky
law would have reached a different substantive result. Had there been the
probability of a different result, the obvious disparity ofbargaining position
would have provided a serious test for the fairness analysis inherent in the
Second Restatement.
One must sharply contrast the results in Fite & Warmath and General
Electric with the result in Breeding." That is one of the core methodology
contract cases in which the supreme court (without discussion of its reason
for ignoring the choice of law clause) applied Kentucky law despite the
presence of a choice of law clause which seemed to indicate that Delaware
law would govern. Perhaps implicit in the reason for the different results
is that the SecondRestatement position on choice of law clauses, somewhat
like that on choice of forum clauses, is that they need not be enforced if the
law chosen would be "contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has
a materially greater interest than the chosen state." e Thus, one might
reason that an analysis similar to that mandated in Prezocki'01 for choice of
forum clauses would have concluded that enforcement of a boilerplate
clause in a master insurance policy activated by issuance in Kentucky to a
Kentucky resident was contrary to fundamental Kentucky policy. While
that has a superficial appeal, it seems inconsistent with the elderly, third-
grade educated worker in GeneralElectric being bound by what was surely
a boilerplate clause. Perhaps the absence of a discernible difference in the
law of the two states may explain the General Electric result. The
presumably sophisticated parties to a major construction contract inFite &
Warmath pose no such dilemma, the supreme court having specifically
notedthat the contract was not an adhesion contract or the result of unequal
bargaining power."2 Without any discussion of the issue, one simply
cannot tell why (in the analysis of the Second Restatement) the supreme
court in Breeding felt application of Delaware law so against the policy of
Kentucky that it could not even be chosen by the parties. It is quite
9ISee id. (citing Big Four Mills v. Commercial Credit Co., 211 S.W.2d 831 (Ky.
1948) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1971)).
9 Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.
1982).
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a).
101 Prezocki v. Bullock Garages, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1997).




possible that what is seen in Breeding is the result of more substantial
Kentucky connections in a situation where the contractual clause indicated
a choice of non-Kentucky law. Alternatively, it is possible that there was
really no conflict between the law of the two states because of the
contractual requirement that a copy of the exclusions be provided to the
insured.103
In sharp contrast to the sub silentio rejection of the choice of law clause
in Breeding is the emphatic rejection of a choice of law clause in Paine v.
La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc.,1 4 which involved a dispute between the
Kentucky sellers and nonresident buyers of land located in Kentucky. The
contract was partially executed in Kentucky and contained a choice of law
clause in favor of Texas law. A dispute arose as to whether the sellers were
bound by a particular clause in the contract. Superficially, the action would
have been time-barred under Texas law but timely under Kentucky law.105
The court of appeals held that the choice of law clause was of no effect
because of the interest which Kentucky had in a claim involving Kentucky
land and a contract at least partially entered into in Kentucky. The court
also noted the result in Breeding, in which the choice of law clause was
ignored. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals characterized
Kentucky as "egocentric or protective concerning choice of law
questions.""°4 The court of appeals neither cited the Second Restatement's
"contrary to a fundamental policy" analysis nor explored what interests of
Kentucky might have been offended by the parties having chosen Texas
law.
These four cases thus present at least a facial inconsistency. While
there is one case (Fite & Warmath) upholding a clause in a major
commercial contract involving sophisticatedparties and one case (General
Electric) upholding such a clause based on the Second Restatement, two
later cases clearly ignore such a clause, with one case (Paine) not citing the
Second Restatement at all and sounding a great deal more like the
"sufficient contact" analysis which is typical of the Kentucky tort cases.
Undoubtedly significant in looking at the pattern is that Fite & Warmath
'
03 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
104 Paine v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987),
overruled on other grounds by Oliver v. Shultz, 885 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1994).
105 I describe that possibility as "superficial" because the court ultimately
concluded that the action was not time-barred by either Kentucky law or Texas law.
Thus, the case is in reality a false conflict, with no choice necessary as to which law
applied.
"O Paine, 736 S.W.2d at 357.
[VOL. 87
CHOICE OF LAW IN KENTUCKY
was a case in which the chosen law was Kentucky. It would be nonsensical
for a forum to ever find that the choice of its own law by the parties is
contrary to its own public policy. Thus, Fite & Warmath provides no real
clue as to the solution for the true problem: when the parties have chosen
the law of a state other than Kentucky.
However confusing, the pattern establishes a clear signal that such
clauses are not to be blindly enforced or taken for granted in Kentucky.
Indeed, the results in the later cases cast grave doubts on enforcement of
such clauses, indicating at a minimum that they require factual exploration.
If one takes it that there was no difference between the law ofthe two states
in General Electric, then the remaining cases all point to application of
Kentucky law where there is a difference and where such choice is made
possible by sufficient factual connections with the forum.
3. Nonresident Insurance Carriers
In what might be viewed either as a contractual dispute somewhat
similar to Lewis 7 or as a recognition of lack of legislative jurisdiction, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals refused to apply Kentucky law to a Tennessee
insurance contract in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co.' The case arose from an
automobile accident in Kentucky between a Kentucky driver and a
Tennessee driver. The Tennessee driver's carrier ultimately paid $15,000
to the Kentucky driver and the Kentucky driver's own carrier paid an
additional $10,000 as underinsured motorist benefits.109 The Kentucky
driver's insurer then sought to recoup its $10,000 from the Tennessee
carrier, which had not registered to do business in Kentucky, upon the
theory that its minimum coverage should have been the $25,000 required
by Kentucky law. Citing both to the result in Lewis (which is consistent in
that it applied the law ofthe place of contracting rather than Kentucky law)
and the Second Restatement, the court of appeals held that Tennessee law
applied, so that the Tennessee insurer was not liable for the higher
amount.'10
"07 Lewis v. American Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1977).
101 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 785
S.W.2d 520 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
'09 See id. at 521.
1o See id. at 522-23 (citing Lewis, 555 S.W.2d at 579; Breeding v. Massa-
chusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1982); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971)).
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The result, like Lewis, is correct because no other conclusion was
possible. The court of appeals was quite close to recognizing that essential
truth when it noted that "the General Assembly has no power to dictate to
a nonresident driver and his nonresident nonregistered insurance carrier
what must be in their contract."'' Indeed, any attempt to apply Kentucky
law to the facts would undoubtedly have been violative of due process
under the classic holding in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick."2 In simple
terms, Kentucky lacked sufficient contacts to satisfy due process had it
attempted to apply its own law to control the contract terms between a
Tennessee insured and her Tennessee insurer, which had not registered to
do business in Kentucky and which had issued the policy in Tennessee.
Thus, the case citedthe SecondRestatement as authority for its position but
also reached a result which was no different than would be reached under
a "sufficient contacts," or Currie, analysis.
4. Workers' Compensation
The problem of a worker who enters an employment relationship in one
state and is physically injured in the course of that employment in another
is common, and there are United States Supreme Court cases stretching
back over half of a century dealing with the problems posed."3 It is now
quite clear that a worker who is employed in one state and injured in
another may recover under the workers' compensation law of either state,"4
even if the worker has had a prior award in the less generous state."5 That
issue may be complicated, however, if the employer has no workers'
compensation insurance coverage. In such cases arising entirely domesti-
cally, most states provide some sort of state-sponsored fund to protect the
worker. In Kentucky, that is accomplished through the Uninsured
Employers' Fund." 6
II1d. at 522.
112 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (holding that a state may not
abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything
done or to be done within them).
"I See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532 (1935); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), overruled
in part by Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965).
"14 See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939). The Second Restatement adopts these constitutional interpretations as its
positions on the issues. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§
181, 182 (1971).
'. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
"
6 See K.R.S. § 342.760 (Michie 1997).
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In Bryant v. Jericol Mining, Inc.,"7 the court of appeals addressed the
claim of a Virginia resident hired in Virginia by a Virginian who had no
workers' compensation insurance. The worker was injured while working
in Kentucky and sought to recover benefits from the Kentucky Uninsured
Employers' Fund. Such cases in Kentucky proceed first through an
administrative proceeding in the Department of Workers' Claims and then
on appeal into the judicial system. Prior to being inthe court of appeals, the
claim of the injured worker in Bryant had been dismissed, apparently upon
the theory that Kentucky's uninsured employer provisions did not apply
because Virginia had the greater contacts with the parties and the events."'
The court of appeals reversed, noting that it was "not concerned whether
Virginia [had] more contacts in the case than Kentucky."' 19 That lack of
concern was because, as. the court of appeals saw the issue, the question
was whether Kentucky had sufficient contacts to trigger application of its
law.120 The court concluded that the physical injury in Kentucky was
sufficient.' 21
This usage of the "sufficient contacts" analysis was more reminiscent
of the methodology used in the Kentucky tort cases than the language
typically encountered in the contracts cases. That should not be surprising
because the fact pattern is much closer to a classic tort case than a contract
case. There was in fact no workers' compensation insurance in effect, so
there was no contractual dispute to resolve. The injury was much more like
the triggering event for a tort case than a dispute over coverage. Thus, the
workers' compensation system (designed to supplant tort and contract
liability between workers and employers for job-related injuries) reverted
to the closest analogy-a physical injury tort-and the court of appeals
concluded that Kentucky law applied because it had sufficient contacts to
do so. The result is consistent with the SecondRestatement (which was not
cited in the decision) and with a "sufficient contacts" analysis.
5. Succession to Property
The advent of modern choice of law systems made little change in the
area of succession to property. This consistency is not surprising since this
is an area which demands certainty and predictability long before actual
'7 Bryant v. Jericol Mining, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).






fact patterns arise at death. Thus, the SecondRestatement retained the First
Restatement's positions that succession to realty (testate'2 and intestate'2)
remained governed by the law of the situs of the realty, while succession
to personalty (testate 24 and intestate'21) was governed by the law of the
decedent's domicile. This pattern has proved as true in Kentucky as in
other states.
In Cox v. Harrison,16 the court faced a situation where it appeared that
a nonresident executed awill which was valid in the state of his residence
and in which he disposed of both personalty (some physically located in
Kentucky) and realty (some physically located in Kentucky). 7 Following
the execution of that will, the nonresident was divorced from the woman
to whom he was married at the time of the execution of the will. 2 8 At the
time of that divorce, a Kentucky statute provided that a divorce had the
effect of revoking a will as it related to realty. 2 9 Citing to the Second
Restatement, the court of appeals held that the validity of the will as it
related to Kentucky realty was governed by Kentucky law. 3' Since the will
had, under Kentucky law, been revoked by the divorce, it could not have
been admitted to probate in Kentucky in an original proceeding and was
similarly barred from admission in an ancillary proceeding involving the
nonresident.' This result simply applied the law of the situs of the realty
to determine the status of testate succession to that realty, the position
which the Second Restatement had adopted from the First Restatement.
Upon reflection, the result seems nonsensical. Kentucky law was
applied to affect the will of a nonresident based upon a divorce decree
apparently granted in another state. The home state of that individual
attached no such consequence to the divorce, as is evident from the fact
that Kentucky's position was not applied to the personalty located in
Kentucky. The personalty's passage was governed by the law of the
decedent nonresident's domicile at the time of his death. It is difficult to
'
22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 239 (1971).
12 3 See id. § 236.
121 See id. § 263.
", See id. § 260.
126 Cox v. Harrison, 535 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1975).
127 See id. at 79.
128 See id.
129 See 1970 Ky. Acts 199, § 1 (1970) (repealed 1982).
130 See Cox, 535 S.W.2d at 78 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 239 (1971)).
13 1 See id. at 79.
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conceive any Kentucky interest furthered by application of its law to these
facts.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the net effect of the result, like so
many other cases, is that Kentucky law was applied to the facts before the
court. Although the source of that decision was said to be the Second
Restatement, the result would have been the same under a "sufficient
contacts" analysis, the situs of the property in Kentucky being sufficient
contact to allow application of Kentucky law. One could also note that the
problem might better have been solved not by approaching it as a choice of
law problem, but as ares judicata issue: the former wife's rights under the
prior will were not extinguished by the divorce decree under the law of the
rendering state. That approach would have had the salutary result of having
her rights be the same in all states since the impact of that divorce decree
would have been required to be honored by all states pursuant to full faith
and credit. Viewed thusly, it may be seen that Kentucky actually lacked an
interest and should not have applied its own law.
The continuation of the prior conflicts treatment for succession to
property has been applied during the modem era to trust matters as well. In
Santoli v. Louisville Trust Co.,'32 a Kentucky trustee was charged with
administration of a trust created many years before under the wills of
persons who were Michigan domiciliaries when they died.133 At a later
time, there was a dispute as to whether the adopted children of one of the
trust beneficiaries were entitled to succeed to an interest in the trust. 3 4 The
difference between how the issue would be handled under Kentucky law
and under Michigan law is not described in the reported decision. Indeed,
the factual connection of Kentucky, other than being the place of business
of the corporate trustee, is unclear. With the only identifiable Kentucky
connection being the place of business of the trustee, there surely was no
Kentucky interest to be furthered in determining who among competing
claimants might be entitled to a share in the trust. In any event, the court
decided in a very abstract fashion that questions as to the law to be applied
to issues of succession to a trust created under the law of Michigan were to
be governed by the law of the testators' domicile at the time of their
death.'35 In support of that position, the court of appeals relied upon a prior
decision, Martin v. Harris, a case long before the modem conflicts era in
32 Santoli v. Louisville Trust Co., 550 S.W.2d 182 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
1 See id. at 182.
'
34 See id. at 183.
135 See id. at 183-84.
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Kentucky. 136 The court could certainly have cited as modem authority the
Second Restatement, which confirms application of the law of the
decedent's domicile in such cases.1 37 The case illustrates the more rigid
rules which survive, which are in sharp contrast to the analysis of interests
typical of modem choice of law systems outside succession to property.
6. Statute of Frauds
It is quite familiar to lawyers that attempts to contract occasionally run
afoul of the statute of frauds. Although every American state has some
variant of that inheritance from the English, most lawyers are probably
unaware that the statutes are not uniform but vary slightly from state to
state. Among the most important variations is the fact that some versions
characterize any attempt to bind in the absence of a writing as "void" and
others say that absent a writing, "no action may be brought" to enforce any
alleged agreement. The first type is typically thought of as a "substantive"
statute of frauds and the latter as a "procedural" statute of frauds. The
Kentucky version is of the latter type.1 8 That fact alone should alert one to
the probability that Kentucky's statute will likely be applied to all litigation
brought in Kentucky, upon the theory (challenged perhaps in terminology 13 9
but not practically in result) that the forum will typically apply its
"procedural" law to disputes in its courts.
In Audiovox Corp. v. Moody,1'" a Kentucky employee of Audiovox
Kentucky filed an action for breach of contract and other claims arising
from her discharge from employment. Part of the employee's claims
involved breach of an alleged oral contract which was said to have been
made during a meeting in New York. Audiovox contended that the breach
of contract claim was barred by the statute of frauds because the contract
was not capable of performance within one year. The court of appeals
ultimately concluded that the contract in question was in fact capable of
performance within one year and thus not within the control of the statute
of frauds. 14'
13 See id. at 183 (citing Martin v. Harris, 203 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1947)).
137 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 268 (1971).
,31 See K.R.S. § 371.0 10 (Michie 1996).
139 The Second Restatement, for example, does not rely upon the character-
ization of an issue as "procedural" but provides that a forum will normally apply
its "own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be consulted."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122.40 Audiovox Corp. v. Moody, 737 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
141 See id. at 470.
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In reaching that conclusion, the court certainly implied (by citation to
the Kentucky statute and Kentucky case law) that it was deciding the issue
under the Kentucky statute of frauds. The court noted, however, that New
York had "adopted an identical statute of frauds to that in effect in
Kentucky. 142
The Second Restatement position on statutes of fraud is that the law
chosen to govern the disputes otherwise arising from the contract should
similarly govern disputes as to the need for a writing. 43 We will not know
how Kentucky will deal with such a situation until facts arise in which the
requirement of a writing would be satisfied under the law of another state
but not under Kentucky's interpretation of its own statute of frauds. The
true question can only arise in a case wherein Kentucky would conclude
that the other state's law would apply to other disputes arising under the
contract. In such a situation, Kentucky would arguably be protecting its
own interest as a forum in refusing to enforce an agreement which lacked
a sufficient writing. Should the pattern of applying Kentucky law when
there are "sufficient contacts" continue, that would surely be a fact pattern
in which Kentucky law could be chosen and would demonstrate conclu-
sively that it is governed not by the Second Restatement but by some sort
of forum-oriented choice of law system, most likely that of Brainerd
Currie. Alternatively, a choice of that other state's law would confirm
usage of the Second Restatement for areas other than torts.
7. Statute ofLimitations
Statutes of limitations historically present difficulties for choice of law
analysis. In the vested rights era, courts struggled to determine whether
such statutes were substantive or procedural, when in reality they had
aspects of both. The Second Restatement mirrors some of those struggles,
with one of its sections holding that an action is time-barred in a forum if,
under the law of the otherwise applicable state, such an action is barred by
a "statute of limitations which bars the right and not merely the remedy."1"
The concept of "barring the right" basically tracks the prior case law about
"substantive" statutes without adhering to the baggage which goes with the
label. More generally, however, the Second Restatement provides that the
forum will not entertain an action barred by forum law, including any
"I Id. at 470 n.1 (citing N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5.701 (McKinney 1998)).
143 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 141.
14 Id. § 143.
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borrowing statute.'45 This latter provision will typically control Kentucky's
results because Kentucky has a borrowing statute."
The impact of the borrowing statute is demonstrated by Ellis v.
Anderson.47 That case involved litigation in Kentucky between two drivers
who had been involved in an accident in Ohio. The injured driver brought
suit in Kentucky, relying upon the Kentucky two-year statute of
limitations'48 applicable to personal injuries. The statute allowed two years
to sue after the final payment of basic reparation benefits. Ohio law
provided a two-year period for suit, but such time ran from the day of the
accident rather than being tied to termination of no-fault benefits. 4 9 The
court of appeals held that the action was time-barred because the Ohio
limitation (being shorter) was required by the borrowing statute to be
applied to the facts.150 If we assume that the merits of the dispute between
the parties would, consistent with Wessling, have been governed by
Kentucky law, this result must mean that Kentucky's borrowing statute is
driven by the place where the claim physically arises rather than by the law
which will be applied to the merits of the litigation.
Both this case and the prior decision in Seat v. Eastern Greyhound
Lines, Inc.' interpret the borrowing statute to mean that Kentucky will
always apply the shorter of such limitations. Had the Ohio statute been
longer and the action time barred under Kentucky law but not Ohio law, the
Kentucky borrowing statute as interpreted in Seat would have applied
Kentucky law. Thus, the net effect, in cases litigated in Kentucky but
arising under' 2 another state's law, is that Kentucky will always apply the
shorter of the two limitations. The presence of the Kentucky borrowing
statute thus makes this traditionally difficult choice of law quite easy in
Kentucky, requiring no reference to a choice of law methodology.
Although this was a fact pattern in which Kentucky law constitutionally
could have applied (even though the impact would have been to lengthen
the time for the action), deferring that Kentucky interest was not done
145 See id. § 142.
141 See K.R.S. § 413.320 (Michie 1992).
147 Ellis v. Anderson, 901 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).
148 See K.R.S. § 304.39-230(1) (Michie 1996).
149 See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Banks-Baldwin 1998).
See Ellis, 901 S.W.2d at 47.
1 Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1965).
1 As noted above, the "where it arose" or "arising under" dimension of the
statute requires some explication as to whether that refers to the place of the
physical occurrence or the jurisdiction whose law is chosen to govern the merits.
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pursuant to Kentucky's choice of law rules. The choice has been made
legislatively, and deference to the legislative directive is correct according
to the Second Restatement and Currie (who always maintained that
deference to foreign law was legislatively controlled) and as a matter of
basic jurisprudence.
8. Uninsured or Underinsured Motorists
The issue of uninsured or underinsured motorists was first confronted
by the Kentucky state courts in Lewis," where it was held that Kentucky
law did not apply to a dispute between nonresidents and their insurance
carrier as to uninsured motorist coverage allegedly applicable to an injury
arising from an accident occurring in Kentucky." Although discussed
more in the context of legislative jurisdiction to control policy terms, a
similar problem existed in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co.'55 Still later, a factual situation
arose in Bonnlander v. LeaderNationallnsurance Company,156 which bore
an amazingly close resemblance to that in Lewis. At issue was the stacking
of coverage of uninsured motorist policies which had been written in Ohio
to cover Indiana insureds who had been injured in an accident in
Kentucky. 57 The argument of the insureds was that Kentucky law should
apply to stack the coverages rather than Indiana law, which would not
allow stacking. Citing the preference of the Kentucky tort cases (Wessling,
Arnett, Foster) for Kentucky law, the insureds contended that Kentucky
law rather than Indiana law applied.15 Rejecting that conclusion and
relying explicitly upon Lewis and the Second Restatement, the court of
appeals found that the matter should be governed by "the law of the state
with the greatest interest in the outcome of the litigation."'159 The result in
Bonnlander was application of Indiana law. 60
5 Lewis v. American Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1977).
'
54 See id. at 581-82.
"I State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 785
S.W.2d 520 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that anonresident operator's nonresident
carrier not registered in Kentucky could not be forced to comply with a no-fault
act).
156 Bonnlander v. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 949 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
157 See id. at 619.
'
58 See id. at 620.
159 Id.
160 See id. at 621.
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A similar conclusion in a case with very similar facts was reached in
Snodgrass v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.' There, a
Virginia resident was injured in Kentucky as a result of an accident in
which the other vehicle was operated by a Kentuckian. 162 The policy limits
of the Kentuckian's liability policy proved inadequate and the Virginian
sought recovery under his own underinsured motorist coverage, which had
been issued in Virginia.1 61 Under the law of Kentucky, he could have
stacked his coverages and thus recovered substantially more than was
available under Virginia law. As had been the case with Lewis and
Bonnlander, the court chose to apply the law of the state in which the
nonresident plaintiff's insurance policy was issued rather than Kentucky
and, as a result, denied the stacking of the policies."
Lewis, Bonnlander, and Snodgrass all choose not to apply Kentucky
law and do so in situations where such a result was required by the limits
of due process, i.e., in fact patterns where a different result would be
violative of due process. Those results are consistent both with Currie's
choice of law system andthe SecondRestatement. Yet, this surely is a close
area. The United States Supreme Court plurality decision in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague161 indicated that a state which was not the situs of
the accident did not violate due process by applying its own stacking rules
to an insurance policy issued elsewhere because of three connecting
factors: (1) the accident victim was employed in the forum and commuted
to work there each day;16 (2) the insurer was licensed to do business in the
forum; and (3) the plaintiff (the administratrix of the deceased insured) had
moved to the forum at the time that the litigation occurred. 67 Apparently,
even the dissent in Allstate assumed that forum law could have been
applied had it been the place of the accident, as was Kentucky in all three
of the cases under consideration. 6 Given that the nature of the dispute was
161 Snodgrass v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., No. 1997-CA-002181-MR,
1998 WL 770467 (Ky. Ct App. Nov. 6, 1998). As of the time of the writing of this
Article, this opinion was not final and could not be cited as authority in any court
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It is included herein for informational purposes
only.
162 See id. at * 1.
163 See id.
'6 See id. at *3.
65Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion).
' Despite, apparently, the fact that the claim did not arise from the employ-
ment or during the course of a commute. See id. at 314.
167 See id.
16I See id. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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contractual, between an insured and his or her insurer, it is difficult to see
why the situs of the accident would have an interest to satisfy due process,
other than rote reliance upon the long-discredited deference to the lex loci.
Thus, I conclude not only that the results in the cases are correct but that
they are the only results consistent with due process. It is interesting to note
that the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Snodgrass, faced with a very strong
argument based upon Allstate, expressly rejected the contention that
Kentucky law should be applied to the claims of the Virginia resident
arising under the policy issued in Virginia, even in view of the fact that his
insurer was also licensed to do business in Kentucky. That rejection was
entirely correct as a policy choice, a c6nflicts choice, and (inferentially) as
a matter of sound, modem constitutional law.
9. Domestic Relations
The area of domestic relations has historically received extensive
treatment in law school courses in conflicts but actually presents few
problems for choice of law. Cases in the area tend to revolve more around
jurisdictional disputes, judgment enforcement, and judgment modification
issues. Kentucky's experience in the modem era has tended in those same
directions even after adoption of a new choice of law methodology.
Typical of the sort of multistate jurisdictional disputes for domestic
relations conflicts is Gaines v. Gaines.'69 There, a couple who had lived
primarily outside Kentucky came to Kentucky to live. The marriage broke
apart and the wife moved to Georgia with the minor children, leaving the
husband in Kentucky. The husband then commenced a dissolution action
in Kentucky, which (at that time) lacked personal jurisdiction over the
wife.17 ° The court of appeals ultimately concluded that with no personal
jurisdiction over the wife and with the children being physically absent
from Kentucky, Kentucky only had jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage17'
and order the husband to pay child support for the absent children. Those
aspects of a trial court decision which had determined the custody and
169 Gaines v. Gaines, 566 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1978).
.
70 This matter arose before passage of the Kentucky Domestic Relations Long
Arm Statute, K.R.S. § 454.220 (Michie 1996), which would now confer personal
jurisdiction over the departing wife for a period of one year after her departure
from Kentucky.
17 It has long been clear that a state which is the domicile of one party to the
marriage has judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the relationship. See Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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visitation of the children, the maintenance obligations of the husband, and
the rights of the parties to personalty not located in Kentucky were reversed
for lack ofjurisdiction.'7 Interestingly, the court of appeals did uphold the
ability of the trial court to make disposition of personalty located in
Kentucky, citing the authority of the Second Restatement.173 That latter
conclusion, founded on traditional notions of quasi in rem jurisdiction,
seems a dubious conclusion in view of the fact that personal jurisdiction
over the wife was expressly found to be absent and the United States
Supreme Court has directed that quasi in rem jurisdiction is constitutionally
unavailable in cases lacking personal jurisdiction.'74 The decision
eliminating that historical use of quasi in rem jurisdiction was extremely
new at the time of Gaines and likely overlooked by the parties and the
courts. Alternatively, it is possible that what was missing from the law and
fact pattern of Gaines was a domestic relations long arm statute. Constitu-
tional availability of such personal jurisdiction is clear from the current
Domestic Relations Long Arm Statute in Kentucky.'75 In such situations,
Shaeffer would not bar the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Viewing a custody issue from the "other side" of Gaines (i.e., a state
faced with a custody decree from a sister state rendered in a proceeding
which lacked personal jurisdiction over one of the parents), the court of
appeals in Batchelor v. Fulcher76 held that an Indiana custody decree in
favor of a father was not binding on the mother (a Kentucky resident) who
was seeking custody of children physically present with her in Kentucky.
The court found that a prior Indiana decree did not preclude the mother's
custodial rights because of a lack of personal jurisdiction over her in that
state.177 The court then found that Kentucky properly exercised jurisdiction
to award custody to the mother because Kentucky was the domicile of the
children at the time of the custody proceeding and the father had been
personally served with process in Kentucky. Citing the proposed official
17 2 See Gaines, 566 S.W.2d at 819.
173 See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OFLAWS § 60 (1971)).
'
74 See Shaeffer v. Heitner, 429 U.S. 813 (1977).
'
75 See K.R.S. § 454.220.
176 Batchelor v. Fulcher, 415 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1967).
177 See id. at 830. It is familiar constitutional law that a parent's custodial right
may not be cut off without personal jurisdiction. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528 (1953). Any purportedly personal judgment rendered without personal
jurisdiction is not entitled to full faith and credit, a proposition which predates even
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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draft of the Second Restatement, the court found personal jurisdiction to
thus be present and remanded the issue of custody to the lower court.'
Historically, one of the more difficult interstate problems for domestic
relations cases has been how to deal with support awards, both child
support and maintenance. The difficulty is caused by the fact that typically
such awards are (as to prospective payments) modifiable in their rendering
state and hence not encompassed within the requirement of full faith.17 9
Kentucky's difficulty is resolvedbythe presence, at the current time, of the
Kentucky version of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
("URESA"). 180 Prior to adoption of that act, however, Kentucky took the
position in White v. Bennett 8' that it should act to enforce such awards and
that it could also increase such an award because of the modifiable status
in the rendering state.
In White, a couple was divorced in Maryland and the husband was
ordered to pay monthly child support.182 Sometime later, at which point the
now-divorced couple lived in Kentucky, the wife sought to do three things:
secure payment of unpaid sums under the Maryland order, secure future
payments at an increased rate, and have the husband ordered to place the
children on his employer-provided health coverage.8 3 The past due amount
was of course recoverable pursuant to full faith and credit because it was
vested and thus like any other money judgment for a sum certain.184 As to
the future amounts, those were not entitled to full faith because they
remained modifiable under Maryland law.185 The Kentucky court nonethe-
less undertook to enforce those future payments and acted to both increase
the support amount and to add a requirement of health insurance provision
for the children.'86 In taking that action, the court of appeals cited the
Second Restatement as authority and reviewed what it felt was the
significant interest of Kentucky in taking such actions. 87 What is of special
178 See Batchelor, 415 S.W.2d at 830-31 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (Proposed Official Draft 1967)).
179 See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 17 (1910).
"
0 See K.RS. § 407.010-A80 (Michie 1996).
181 White v. Bennett, 553 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
182 See id. at 846.
183 See id.
114 See Sistare, 218 U.S. at 1.
85See White, 553 S.W.2d at 846-47 (citing Sistare, 218 U.S. at 17; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 109 (1971)).
18 6 See id. at 847.
197 See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 60). All
interested parties (both divorced parents and the children) were Kentucky
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significance for our purposes is that Kentucky undertook (independent of
the statutory duties of URESA) to take such an action and, as in so many
other instances, cited the Second Restatement as its authority for doing so.
In so doing, however, we should note that it favored the significant
Kentucky interests of providing support for persons then living within its
borders.
Finally, Kentucky has shown itself exceptionally progressive in dealing
with an unanswered question which has plagued domestic relations
conflicts law (although the issue is much broader than just the domestic
relations area) since the turn of this century: whether an equity decree of
a sister state will be honored by an enforcing state-the issue left unan-
swered by the United States Supreme Court in Fall v. Eastin18 8 In Arthur
v. Arthur,"8 9 the court of appeals addressed a fact pattern incredibly similar
to Fall. The Arthurs were divorced in Indiana in an action in which the
husband (who was subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Indiana court)
was ordered to convey to the wife real property located in Kentucky."I The
husband did not comply and the wife was given a deed by a commissioner
of the Indiana court.1 91 The husband then conveyed the property to his
brother, who apparently took possession with notice of the commissioner's
deed to the wife. The wife then brought an action in Kentucky to clear her
title to the land. The court of appeals held that the deed between the
husband and his brother was in fact void (presumably because of notice of
the ex-wife's interest) but found that the trial court's recognition of the ex-
wife's title under the Indiana commissioner's deed had been an error.1 92 It
was concluded, citing Fall, that a deed of ajudicial official in Indiana could
not convey title to Kentucky real estate. 93 On that point, the case is indeed
like Fall, but the result was very unlike Fall because the court of appeals
found (as did the concurring opinion of Justice Holmes in Fall") that the
domiciliaries at the time of the action to enforce prior support and to enforce and
increase future support.
1"I Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909) (establishing the long standing rule that a
court cannot effectively pass by judicial conveyance good title to real property
outside its jurisdiction and thereby bind its sister jurisdiction where the property is
located).
19 Arthur v. Arthur, 625 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
190 See id. at 593.




94 See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 15 (1909) (Holmes, J., concurring).
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proper remedy was for the ex-wife to seek to have the Kentucky courts
direct the same conveyance as had the Indiana court.' 95 Should the ex-
husband disobey the Kentucky order, a master commissioner's deed would
obviously be available and fully valid as to Kentucky real estate. The court
of appeals thus held that Kentucky courts should enforce the equities
arising from a sister state decree, regardless of whether required by full
faith and credit. Beyond that interesting conclusion, moreover, the court of
appeals cited as its authority the Second Restatement.'96
These cases in the area of domestic relations all carry a common thread
of citation to the Second Restatement of Conflicts, although typically in
regard to such issues as judgments and jurisdiction, not the classic choice
of law disputes encountered elsewhere. In all instances where a choice was
necessary (i.e., some difference existed between Kentucky law and the law
of another state), there is not a single instance of choosing the law of
another state. Thus, one could again conclude that whatever the cases say,
what they in fact do is choose Kentucky law whenever it is possible to do
so and whenever it makes a difference.
C. A Pattern for Choice of Law in Kentucky
Looking then to the state cases in the modem era, what seems to
emerge is a pattern-and one which has unfortunate timing dimensions
because of the order inwhich the cases emerged. The torts cases (Wessling,
Arnett, Foster) all choose Kentucky law as controlling, citing as their
authority that Kentucky has sufficient contacts to do so.197 It is worthwhile
noting that those three seminal cases originate (with Wessling) in 1967 and
conclude (with Foster) in 1972. In sharp contrast, the non-tort conflict
cases primarily begin (with Lewis) in 1977 and continue to virtually the
present time.'98 What is conspicuous is that the tort cases predate the other
conflicts cases and, viewed in a historical perspective, stand aside from all
the other cases in language, if not in result. The consistent theme in the
non-tort conflict cases is a citation to the Second Restatement, in quite
sharp contrast to the apparent rejection of that methodology in Arnett and
Foster where it is generally thought that application of "significant
115 See Arthur, 625 S.W.2d at 595.
196 See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102
(1971)).
197 See supra notes 17-48 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 49-196 and accompanying text.
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contacts" rather than "sufficient contacts" would have altered the result.
We will revisit that general perception once the additional body of data
contained in federal case law is examined.
That contrast between tort cases and non-tort cases was recognized by
the court of appeals in Bonniander v. Leader National Insurance Co.l99
There, facts amazingly close to those in Lewis were found. At issue was the
stacking of coverage of uninsured motorist policies which had been written
in Ohio to cover Indiana insureds who had been injured in an accident in
Kentucky. The argument of the insureds was that Kentucky law should
apply to stack the coverages rather than Indiana law, which would not
allow stacking.2°° Citing the preference of the Kentucky tort cases
(Wessling, Arnett, Foster) for Kentucky law, the insureds contended that
Kentucky law rather than Indiana law applied.2"' Rejecting that conclusion
and relying explicitly upon Lewis, the court of appeals stated that the
insureds were "confusing choice of law as it applies to torts and choice of
law as it applies to contract actions."2 2 As to the difference between tort
and contract actions, the court of appeals found that tort actions chose
Kentucky law if there was "any significant contact with Kentucky," while
contract actions chose "the law of the state with the greatest interest in the
outcome of the litigation."2 ' The result in BonnIander was application of
Indiana law."' Although the facts in Bonniander only justified the court of
appeals making an observation as to a dichotomy between tort and contract
cases, the discussion herein clearly indicates that the dichotomy is between
tort cases and all other conflicts cases by the Kentucky courts in the
modem era.
Thus, Kentucky maybe governed by what is essentially a choice of law
system with a split personality. It can clearly be seen that the classic,
forum-oriented, "sufficient contacts" analysis of Brainerd Currie is
followed for tort cases. It can at least be argued that the "significant con-
tacts" analysis of the SecondRestatement is the preferred methodology for
all other cases. What is missing, however, is a recognition that cases hold
what they do, not what they say. One can closely analyze the results and
wonder whether even the contract cases are not in actuality showing a pre-
ference for Kentucky law in all instances where it is possible to be chosen,
'
99 Bonnlander v. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 949 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
2
°°Seeid. at 619.
201 See id. at 620.
202 Id.
203 Id.
214 See id. at 621.
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but the clear language in favor of the Second Restatement in those cases is
always going to pose difficulties, unless there is some alternative explana-
tion available here.
D. Synthesizing the Lines of State Cases
If one attempts to synthesize the Kentucky state court decisions, avery
clear pattern emerges in terms of results if not of methodology. As
described previously, there are twenty-four modern era Kentucky state
court conflicts cases. Only nine; 5 of those apply the law of a state other
than Kentucky. Those are:
Lewis v. American Family Insurance Group.2 6 The case is actually a
false conflict in which Kentucky lacked sufficient contact to satisfy due
process had it attempted to apply its own law. 7 Put differently, there was
no Kentucky interest to be furthered by applying its law to alter the
outcome of the litigation on the merits.
Santoli v. Louisville Trust Co.2°8 The case involved no Kentucky
interest in the dispute as to whether a particular individual was entitled to
share in an interest in a trust created under the will of a nonresident
decedent. Any attempt to apply Kentucky law to that particular issue would
likely have violated due process.
General Electric Co. v. Martin.2°9 Kentucky law was not applied
because a choice of law clause indicated that another state's law was
applicable.10 The opinion indicated that there was no difference (on the
applicable issue) between Kentucky law and the law of the state chosen by
the clause.2 ' Thus, the case presented a false conflict in which the outcome
on the merits would not have been altered by application of Kentucky law.
The "choice" had in any event been contractually made.
PrudentialResources Corp. v. Plunkett.212 There is actually no decision
as to which law to apply to the merits but simply deference to a choice of
forum clause.1 3
205 In Arthur v. Arthur, 625 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), the issue was
really whether to defer to a sister state equity decree rather than making a pure (i.e.,
not previously judicially determined) choice of law. See id. at 595. Thus, it is not
counted as an eighth deviation from the general pattern.
2 Lewis v. American Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1977).
207 See id. at 581-82.
208 Santoli v. Louisville Trust Co., 550 S.W.2d 182 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
21 General Elec. Co. v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
210 See id. at316 n.1.
211 See id.
212 Prudential Resources Corp. v. Plunkett, 583 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
213 See id. at 100.
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Arthur v. Arthur.2 14 The "application" of other state law was reallyjust
a willingness to enforce a sister state equity decree and hence not a choice
deferring Kentucky law in any respect.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Tennessee Farmers
Mutual Insurance Co.2"' Although slightly different as to the substantive
issue involved, the case was substantially like Lewis, being a false conflict
in which there was no Kentucky interest to be furthered by applying its
own law to the merits and any attempt to do so would have violated due
process. 216
Ellis v. Anderson.21 7 The decision to apply the law of a state other than
Kentucky when Kentucky's law could constitutionally have been chosen
was mandated by the Kentucky borrowing statute.218 Thus, the decision to
defer to another state's law was made legislatively rather than under
Kentucky's choice of law rules.
Prezocki v. Bullock Garages, Inc.21 9 That Kentucky law was not
ultimately applied is really just an unlikely possibility. The case was
remanded to develop a record on application of the choice of law clause in
favor of Illinois. Given the consumer-driven facts, Kentucky law most
likely should have been applied.
Bonnlander v. LeaderNationallnsurance Co.2" and Snodgrass v. State
Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co. 2 As was the case with Lewis and
State Farm, these cases were false conflicts in which there was no
Kentucky interest to be furthered by applying its law to the merits of the
litigation and any attempt to apply Kentucky law would have violated due
process.
What the cases thus indicate, in result if not in language, is that
Kentucky is choosing to apply its own law to the merits whenever it has the
constitutional ability to do so and that this pattern carries over to all types
of cases rather than being limited to tort cases as might be implied from the
extensive citation to the Second Restatement in the non-tort cases. The
214 Arthur v. Arthur, 625 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
21' State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 785
S.W.2d 520 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).216 See id. at 522.
217 Ellis v. Anderson, 901 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).
218 See id. at 48.
219 Prezocki v. Bullock Garages, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1997).
0 Bonnlander v. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 949 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Ky. Ct. App.
1996).
"' Snodgrass v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 1997-CA-002181-MR,
1998 WL 770467 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1998).
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exceptions to that pattern thus are Ellis, wherein the deviation from
Kentucky law was legislatively directed, and Prudential Resources and
General Electric, where choices were contractually made.
Perhaps what this bespeaks, with the benefit of thirty years of
hindsight, is that the Second Restatement's results (as a practical matter)
are not as different from those of Currie as might have been thought when
the two competing choice of law philosophies were being viewed
prospectively. Indeed, I can observe from the Kentucky cases only Arnett
and (arguably) Foster as cases in which the Kentucky result differed from
that which the Second Restatement would have approved. Even that may
be overstating the case since Professor Reese (Reporter for the Second
Restatement) himself stated that Foster was "a close case ' ' m and only
opined in favor of Ohio law "if [he were] forced to decide." 3 If a
reasonable analysis under the Second Restatement could support the
decision in Foster, then only Arnett would stand out in the Kentucky state
court experience as inconsistent with the Second Restatement.
There is a tremendous amount of citation in the Kentucky case law to
the SecondRestatement. If one may conclude that the Kentucky experience
is consistent with both the Second Restatement and Professor Currie's
proposed methodology, then a very valuable insight is gained and a useful
source of information (the Second Restatement) is made available and
applicable to all Kentucky choice of law issues, not just those relating to
issues other than torts. Thus, the "most significant relationship" aspect of
section 6 of the SecondRestatement appears, after thirty years in Kentucky
at least, to have proved compatible with the interest analysis. 4
This pattern will obviously pose difficulties for the future in Kentucky
until it is addressed and dealt with, either by synthesis or by recognition,
that two different systems are being used. The pattern appears to be
uniformly forum-oriented and quite consistent with where it began-the
modem era tort cases with their results in favor of application of forum law
whenever possible. In the non-tort cases, there is not a single modem era
case to "voluntarily" choose the law of another jurisdiction when
Kentucky had an ability to choose its own law and a forum interest was
violated by the choice of non-Kentucky law. The difficulty of the dichoto-
mous language in this pattern is manifesting itself in the experience of
222 Reese, supra note 34, at 374.
223Id. at 373.
2'4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
2 By this it is meant that there was no legislative directive (borrowing statute,
etc.) or contractual choice (choice of law clause, etc.).
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
federal courts, which are in most instances required to apply Kentucky's
choice of law rules. A review of the federal experience demonstrates how
unclear the Kentucky choice of law rules really are.
m. FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH
KENTUCKY'S CHOICE OF LAW METHODOLOGY
The courts of the United States for the most part have no independent
choice of law methodology.226 Despite having obvious frequent exposure
to conflicts issues because of the existence of diversity jurisdiction, 7
federal courts are obliged by Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing
Co.," a policy outgrowth of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 9 to apply the
choice of law rules of the state in which they are sitting. The only exception
to that requirement is that in cases which are transferred to a federal court
pursuant to the forum non conveniens standards of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the
court is required to apply the choice of law rules of the transferor court.?0
Thus, federal courts are peculiarly attuned to (and at the mercy of) state
choice of law rules, particularly those of the state in which they sit. Those
facts have caused Kentucky's federal courts and (occasionally) federal
courts in sister states to struggle with the content of Kentucky's choice of
law rules. Given the confused picture set forth above, it is not surprising
that the federal courts have had considerable difficulties.
26 In matters governed by federal law (whether the Constitution, federal
statutes, federal regulations, or federal common law), state conflicts rules are, of
course, irrelevant. Thus, state choice of law rules have no application in admiralty
cases. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). Even when it is
necessary to decide between United States law and the law of a foreign country in
cases involving foreign governments, state law is inapplicable. See, e.g., United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). In such cases, there actually is a limited body
of federal conflicts law. The methodology applied therein is currently the Second
Restatement. See Aqua-Marine Constructors, Inc. v. Banks, 110 F.3d 663 (9th
Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Polaris Ins. Co. v. Aqua-Marine Constructors, Inc., 118
S. Ct. 339 (1997).
'
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1998) (enabling statute for federal courts' diversity
jurisdiction).
I Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that in
diversity jurisdiction cases, a federal court must use the choice of law of the state
where it sits).
",9 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that in diversity
jurisdiction cases, a federal court must generally use the law of the state in which
it sits).231 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994).
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A. Jurisdiction Selecting Mechanisms
1. Choice ofForum Clauses
The Kentucky state courts' position on such clauses appears clear. In
the modem era, Kentucky's courts are committed to the Second Restate-
ment's notion that such clauses do not oust the nonchosen forum of
jurisdiction and that analysis of such clauses in the factual context of a
particular dispute is necessary to determine if application would be "unfair
or unreasonable."'
In Horning v. Sycom,2 32 a Kentucky dentist purchased a computer
billing system from a Wisconsin limited partnership which had created the
software for the system and a Texas corporation which manufactured the
hardware. 3 The sale occurred as a result of a sales call upon the Kentucky
dentist by representatives of the Wisconsin software seller. The system did
not work and the dentist brought suit in Kentucky asserting various claims,
including tort and contract theories.u4 The sellers sought to have the case
transferred to Wisconsin based upon a Wisconsin choice of law and choice
of forum clause contained in the form contract signed by the dentist.?35 The
district court denied the transfer motion, finding the issue directly
controlled by the Kentucky Court of Appeals decision in Prudential
Resources Corp. v. Plunkett.u6 Looking to the SecondRestatement as it did
in Plunkett, the court found that such a clause did not oust Kentucky of
jurisdiction and that Kentucky was preferred as a forum because the dentist
wouldbe seriously inconveniencedby litigation in Wisconsin, coupledwith
the fact that there had been a severe disparity in bargaining position
between the parties. 37
A similar factpattem, butwhere the chosen forum was Kentucky, arose
in KFC Corp. v. Lilleoren where KFC (a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Kentucky) filed suit in Kentucky against the
Oregon holders of two franchises. The franchisees sought a transfer to
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971).
2 Homing v. Sycom, 556 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Ky. 1983).
233 See id. at 820.
234 See id.
35 See id.
26 See id. at 821 (citing Prudential Resources Corp. v. Plunkett, 583 S.W.2d 97
(Ky. Ct. App. 1979)).
2 Seeid. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTOFLAWS § 80 (1971)).
s8KFC Corp. v. Lileoren, 783 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Ky. 1992).
1998-991
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
federal court in Oregon since the claims arose from the operations of
franchises in three cities in that state, but KFC resisted upon the grounds
of a Kentucky choice of forum clause contained in the franchise agree-
ments?39 In upholding the forum selection clause (and refusing the
transfer), the court did not make any reference at all to Kentucky state law
on the subject but relied solely on two United States Supreme Court
decisions, one of which upheld such a clause24 and another of which
affirmed a transfer despite the existence of such a clause.241 The court
concluded that the message of the United States Supreme Court had
been that substantial deference was to be given t6 such clauses and that
absent evidence of substantial unfairness, they should be upheld.242 The
court then noted that the record before it was devoid of any such
evidence.2 43 While the failure to make a reference to Kentucky law is
troubling, the result is consistent withPlunkett andthe SecondRestatement,
which in the absence of affirmative evidence against application would
uphold the clause.
It is difficult to form much of a conclusion about the federal court's
actions in Creditors Collection Bureau, Inc. v. Access Data, Inc.24 because
neither the normal factual information about the parties (state of incor-
poration, principal place of business, etc.) nor the underlying facts can
be determined from the reported opinion. All that is known is that
the parties were signatories to a contract which contained a Tennessee
choice of forum clause.245 One party brought suit in Kentucky and
the defendant sought, similar to KFC, to have the case transferred to
Tennessee under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).24 In making the
decision to uphold the clause and order the transfer, the court, as in KFC,
made no reference at all to Kentucky state law but rather relied upon
United States Supreme Court case law,247 pointing as well to Sixth Circuit
239 See id. at 1023-24.
240 See id. at 1024 (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,
590 (1991)).
241 See id. at 1024-25 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22
(1988)).242 See id. at 1025.
243 See id.
244 Creditors Collection Bureau, Inc. v. Access Data, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 311
(W.D. Ky. 1993).
245 See id. at 312.
4 See id.
247 See id. at 313 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988),
for the proposition that such clauses were not automatically valid but that they were
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precedent 48 to the effect that such clauses should be upheld unless
unreasonable under the circumstances. Finding nothing in the facts to
suggest that it would be unreasonable to the plaintiff to enforce the clause,
the court ordered the transfer. Again, the result appears quite compatible
with that observed in Kentucky state cases on the issue although they are
not referred to in the decision.
The results in the cases surely appear consistent with the Kentucky
choice of law position on choice of forum cases. The emphasis on
upholding, except for cases of "substantial unfairness," is certainly
consistent with the Kentucky (and Second Restatement) position on the
issue. The federal cases are disturbing, however, in that only Horninguses
the Kentucky analysis.249 KFC and Creditors Collection appear more
interested in federal law on the issue,150 possibly upon the theory that what
is being determined is a transfer under the appropriate federal statute and
that a federal court may ignore state conflicts decisions in deciding such an
issue. It would seem, however, that since the transfer decision is being
determined by the validity of a clause which is itself a creature of state law
(i.e., contained in a contract which is clearly governed by state law), it
would be anomalous to ignore that state law.
2. Door Closing Provisions
In quite sharp contrast to the choice of forum clause, one may
occasionally encounter (most typically through a statute) a "door closing"
provision which purports to close the doors of a state's courts to particular
persons or to particular types of actions." Such cases may have a
superficial appearance as conflicts cases, but at the threshold issue of
whether to serve as a forum, they are not. They are, most simply, cases in
which the state courts would not entertain an action, and the issue posed in
the federal system is whether a federal court in that particular state is
similarly disqualified. The cases are thus more in line with the Erie
factors to be considered in making a transfer decision).
248 See id. (citing Moses v. Business Card Express, 929 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir.
1991)).249 See Homing v. Sycom, 556 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D. Ky. 1983).
'so See Creditors Collection, 820 F. Supp. at 312-13; KFC Corp. v. Lilleoren,
783 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (W.D. Ky. 1992).
"' See, for example, the Mississippi statute in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,




controls of federalism than with the Klaxon mandate to apply state choice
of law rules5' 2
In the Sixth Circuit, an encounter with such a Kentucky provision
occurred in Miller v. Davis, 3 an action brought in Kentucky seeking
pension benefits onbehalfofKentuckybeneficiaries ofatrust administered
in the District of Columbia by a labor union. The actual issue in the case
was whether a federal court in Kentucky could adjudicate the dispute at all
since the district court had concluded that a Kentucky state court (faced
with the same situation) would have had no jurisdiction over a trust which
had its situs outside Kentucky.' That aspect of the decision was reversed,
the Sixth Circuit holding that under its interpretation of the line of cases
beginning with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 5 such a course of action
by the Kentucky state courts would not be binding on the federal court. 6
The Sixth Circuit further noted that the source of the alleged"door closing"
dimension of Kentucky law was a relatively old Kentucky case,' the
results of which were very much in doubt due to later developments in
Kentucky's law of long arm jurisdiction and choice of law. 8 Thus, the
Sixth Circuit was uncertain whether a Kentucky state court would in fact
have concluded that it lacked jurisdiction or that the law of the District of
Columbia should be applied to claims made by Kentucky beneficiaries.5 9
As to the possibility that Kentucky law might actually be applied in the
modem era to the merits of such a claim, the Sixth Circuit relied upon a
Second Restatement shift of position which favored application of
Kentucky law over the law of the District of Columbia. 60 Not needing to
decide what was Kentucky's choice of law rule in the context of the appeal
before it, the Sixth Circuit remanded for subsequent proceedings. 6
z52 See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974).
254 See id. at 311.
15 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
26 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 314. This "door closing" aspect of the case under the
analysis of Erie is discussed at length in John R. Leathers, Miller v. Davis: The
Sixth Circuit Applies an Interest Analysis to an Erie Problem, 63 KY. L.J. 923
(1975).
217 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 315 (citing Wilder v. United Mine Workers Welfare
& Retirement Fund, 346 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1961)).
"ss See id. (citing K.R.S. § 454.2 10 (Michie 1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 299 (1971)).
2-59 See id. at 316.
260 See id. at 315-16 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
267).
261 See id. at 318.
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In retrospect, the Sixth Circuit reached a correct result, quite apart from
the issue of whether the alleged Kentucky door closing position was
binding on a federal court. With the benefit of more than twenty years of
subsequent Kentucky conflicts law, we now know the court was correct
that Kentucky would want to apply its own law to duties of a trustee
occurring outside Kentucky where the impact upon Kentucky beneficiaries
was clear. Any notion that Kentucky lacked personal jurisdiction over such
a trustee could not sustain modem long arm analysis. In addition to the fact
thattheSecondRestatementappearedto favor application of Kentucky law,
Kentucky's forum-oriented system would dictate choice of Kentucky law
concerning the trustee's duties to Kentuckians.
3. Choice ofLaw Clauses
Upon five occasions in the modem era of Kentucky conflicts jurispru-
dence, federal courts have faced issues raised by choice of law clauses. In
none do they appear to have noted the very clear signals of Kentucky law
that such clauses are not to be blindly enforced but must be subjected to
factual scrutiny.
In Inre Velasco,26 a doctor who was apparently domiciled in Kentucky
contracted with a California corporation to engage in a sale and leaseback
for medical and office equipment to be used in the doctor's practice. The
lease contained a California choice of law clause. 263 When the doctor
became bankrupt, it was necessary to determine the status of the arrange-
ment to rule upon whether the lease constituted an executory contract. The
court determined that the lease was, under California law, not an executory
contract and thus to be treated as a loan with a security arrangement. 2" In
choosing to apply California law pursuant to the choice of law clause, the
court referred to both state26" and federa2 66 case law, as well as to the
Uniform Commercial Code.267 Although fifteen years after Kentucky's
emergence into the modem conflicts era, the court chose not to rely upon
In re Velasco, 13 B.R. 872 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
'See id. at 873.
2,4See id. at 874.
265 See id. (citing Big Four Mills Ltd. v. Community Credit Co., 211 S.W.2d
831 (Ky. 1948), as predating the modem era of conflicts jurisprudence in
Kentucky).
26 See id. (citing Consolidated Jewelers Inc. v. Standard Fin. Corp., 325 F.2d
31 (6th Cir. 1963), as predating the modem era of Kentucky conflicts
jurisprudence).
267 See id. (quoting U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1989)).
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modem case law but to apply older law, which may or may not have been
applicable after modem developments in Kentucky. Indeed, we know from
Kentucky's decisions in Fite & Wannath268 and General Electric269 that
such clauses were upheld prior to the consideration by the bankruptcy court
in Jelasco. We also know, however, from the later decisions inBreeding270
and Paine27 that such clauses have been subjected to scrutiny (and
occasionally disregarded) underthe SecondRestatement analysis when they
did not choose Kentucky law. Thus, the decision to enforce the California
choice of law clause without careful examination of the underlying
circumstances in Velasco appears to be an error, at least with the benefit of
knowing the cases which postdate it.
Similarly, in In re Glover Construction Co.,2" a Kentucky buyer of
equipment contracted with a seller (apparently a nonresident of Kentucky)
for installation in Kentucky. In the midst of a dispute over the duties of the
buyer and seller under the contract (which contained a Kentucky choice of
law clause), the buyer filed for bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy
court was then called upon to determine whether there did in fact exist a
binding contract. The court chose to apply Kentucky law.2" The court
seemed to assume that such would have been the case because Kentucky
was the place of performance of the contract. That seems an ill-founded
conclusion since the dispute between the parties went to the validity of the
contract (it was missing certain material elements) and that would
historically have been an issue governed by the law of the place of the
making of the contract. There are not sufficient facts given in the reported
decision to determine where that may have been. In any event, the court
applied Kentucky law because of the choice of law clause.274 That is a
sensible solution, since the result was to choose to apply the law of the
forum. One must wonder, however, about the wisdom of basing the result
on the choice of law clause since the ultimate conclusion was that no
binding contract existed; it is difficult to conceive how a "non-contract"
can nevertheless result in a binding contract as to the choice of law issue.
26 Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1977).
269 General Elec. Co. v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
270 Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.
1982).
271 Paine v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987),
overruled on other grounds by Olive v. Shulty, 885 S.W.2d 699 (1994).272In re Glover Constr. Co., 49 B.R. 581 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
273 See id. at 583-84.
274 See id. at 583 n.4.
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Nevertheless, in result, the case fits the pattern of Fite & Warmath,275 but
it is disturbing that the opinion of the bankruptcy court cites no Kentucky
case authority whatsoever pertaining to choice of law clauses.
In Gateway Press, Inc. v. Leejay, Inc.,276 the case presented an
argument between a resident seller of services and a nonresident buyer of
the result of those services. The seller, a Kentucky corporation with its
principal place of business in Kentucky, contracted with the buyer, a
Massachusetts corp oration with its principal place of business in Massachu-
setts, to present certain pages portraying the buyer's merchandise for
inclusion in a catalog to be printedby a third party outside Kentucky. When
the buyer failed to pay, the seller filed suit in Kentucky. The nonresident
buyer unsuccessfully contestedpersonaljurisdiction.2" What is interesting
for our purpose, however, is that the contract between the parties contained
a choice of law clause in favor of Kentucky law, and the court cited it with
approval as part of its conclusion that Kentucky did in fact have personal
jurisdiction.28 It is clear that the court assumed the choice of law clause
to have been valid under the facts at hand. Given what we know from other
sources of Kentucky choice of law on the topic (i.e., Fite & Warmath,279
General Electri, 20 Breeding,28 1 and Paine282), the issue is not as clear as
275 Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1977).
276 Gateway Press, Inc. v. Leejay, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Ky. 1997).
277 It should hardly be surprising that jurisdiction was found under the "doing
business" portion of the Kentucky Long Arm Statute, K.R1S. § 454.210(2)(a)
(Michie 1985 & Supp. 1996). See Gateway Press, 993 F. Supp. at 580. While the
case law historically draws a distinction between nonresident buyers and
nonresident sellers, even a nonresident buyer may be subjected to personal
jurisdiction upon sufficient facts. The factual contacts of the nonresident in
Gateway Press seem to exceed those in Tube Turns Division of Chemetron Corp.
v. Patterson Co., 562 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), and more closely resemble
the facts in Info-Med, Inc. v. National Healthcare, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 793 (W.D.
Ky. 1987).
278 See Gateway Press, 993 F. Supp. at 581. Such a clause is not conclusive as
to personal jurisdiction but is evidence of an intent by a nonresident to avail
himself or herself of the benefits and protections of the law of the chosen state. See
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 469-72 (1985).
2.9 Fite & Warmath, 559 S.W.2d at 729.
280 General Elec. Co. v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
21 Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.
1982).
2 Paine v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987),
overruled on other grounds by Oliver v. Shultz, 885 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1994).
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most might suppose. While the facts in Gateway Press most likely would
lend themselves to validating the clause, it is unfortunate that the court did
not at least undertake the analysis which appears mandated from the later
Kentucky state court cases. It is extremely likely, however, that any
analysis would have resulted in applying Kentucky law because it is
virtually unthinkable that Kentucky would conclude that a clause calling
for application of Kentucky law is violative of Kentucky's policy.
The first Sixth Circuit consideration of such clauses came in
WorldSource Coil Coating, Inc. v. McGraw Construction Co.283 McGraw
agreed to construct a plant in Kentucky for WorldSource; the facility was
to be financed by General Electric Capital.284 Construction was taking place
pursuant to a written contract which contained both an arbitration clause
and an Illinois choice of law clause.28 A dispute arose when the contractor
contended work was complete but that it should be paid for certain
additions. Although the contractor originally stated that it would seek
arbitration, it instead filed suit in a Kentucky state court, seeking both
injunctive relief and damages.28 6 The action was removed to federal court,
where the contractor sought to compel arbitration. The district court refused
to order arbitration, finding that under Illinois law the filing of the action
by the contractor had constituted a waiver of its right to compel
arbitration.8 7 It appears that none of the parties questioned that the issue of
whether such conduct amounted to waiver was to be governed by Illinois
law, presumably because of the choice of law clause.288 There is no
discussion in the case of whether either the district court or the Sixth
Circuit believed that Kentucky's choice of law rules would have required
an upholding of the Illinois choice of law clause. The facts are so scant that
one cannot even begin the "fundamental fairness" analysis which the
Second Restatement and the Kentucky cases contemplate. Perhaps the
solution is that the result is correct by the "agreement" (i.e., failure to raise
the issue, rather than the choice of law clause encountered in other cases)
of the parties to utilize Illinois law, but the possibility also exists that
counsel for the contractor simply never realized that one might, under the
Kentucky analysis, escape such clauses. One may also wonder why no one
283 WorldSource Coil Coating, Inc. v. McGraw Constr. Co., 946 F.2d 473 (6th
Cir. 1991).284 See id. at 475.
28s See id. at 476 n.1.
286 See id. at 475.
287 See id. at 476-77.
2
"
8 See id. at 476 n.3.
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thought to argue that the contract was encompassed within the Federal
Arbitration Act 289 and to contend that under case law pursuant to that
statute, such an action was not a waiver. There is in fact a dissenting
opinion which argued in favor of federal law controlling, and the reference
for authority therein is to federal case law in favor of arbitration without
mentioning the federal statute.2"
Similar Sixth Circuit enforcement of such a clause occurred in Tractor
& Farm Supply, Inc. v. Ford New Holland, Inc.291 Tractor, a Kentucky
corporation with its principal place of business in Kentucky, was a dealer
for Ford New Holland, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Michigan, at a Kentucky location pursuant to a franchise
agreement which contained a Michigan choice of law clause.292 Ford
canceled the agreement, placedthe fianchise with anew dealer, and several
Tractor employees left to work for the new dealership.293 Tractor filed suit
against Ford for breach of contract and fraud. In a strange shift of position,
Ford argued that Kentucky law should apply to the contract dispute rather
than Michigan law as was called for under the contract which Ford
drafted.294 Although the court acknowledged that Kentucky had ignored a
choice of law clause in Breeding,29 the court noted the favorable disposi-
tion of Kentucky courts toward such clauses inPaine,2 96 particularly where
the party arguing to ignore the clause was its drafter. Thus, the court upheld
the choice of law clause and applied Michigan law to the contract claims. 297
As a group, Glover Construction and Gateway Press surely reach cor-
rect results in that they apply Kentucky law, in both instances as a result of
enforcing choice of law clauses in favor of Kentucky law. In Velasco,
however, the upholding of a clause in favor of California law may well be
at odds with the Kentucky state court decisions which, apparently based on
219 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
o See WorldSource, 946 F.2d at 481 (Gadala, D.J., dissenting) (citing Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)).
291 Tractor & Farm Supply, Inc. v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1198
(W.D. Ky. 1995).292 See id. at 1201.
293 See id.
294 See id. at 1201-02.
295 See id. at 1202 (citing Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co.,
633 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1982)).296 See id. at 1202-03 (citing Paine v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 736 S.W.2d
355 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Oliver v. Schultz, 885
S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1994)).297See id. at 1203.
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the Second Restatement, appear more oriented toward choosing Kentucky
law where there is an element of unfairness to a Kentucky domiciled
consumer-party. In WorldSource, there is no apparent explanation forusing
Illinois law pursuant to a choice of law clause without at least undertaking
the analysis called for in the SecondRestatement, although there may be no
harm since the issue should most likely have been governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act in any event. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is not a
single federal case which, when confronted with a choice of law clause, has
undertaken the skeptical inquiry required by the later Kentucky cases.
4. Kentucky's Borrowing Statute and Statutes ofLimitations
As noted previously from the Kentucky state court cases, the Kentucky
conflicts position on statutes of limitations can be easily summarized.
Because of the interaction between the borrowing statute298 and Seat,299
actions will normally be governed by the shorter statute of limita-
tions-Kentucky's or that of the state where the claim arose. In the federal
setting, there may be a difference caused by the fact that upon the occasion
of a transfer from another state pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a federal
court in Kentucky will actually apply the other state's choice of law
rules.3°° This may have the effect of reaching a different result than if the
action were being tried in a Kentucky state court. In none of the reported
federal decisions has that occurred, but it is a pattern which may occur and
of which note should be taken.
Typical of the reported cases is T-Birds, Inc. v. Thoroughbred
Helicopter Service, Inc.,01 in which an Ohio resident was injured in a
helicopter crash in Ohio. An action was brought in Ohio against the owner
of the helicopter service and a company which had overhauled the
helicopter in Kentucky. The action was originally brought in Ohio but was
transferred to Kentucky under of 28 U.S.C. § 1406 because some of the
defendants were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio. 2 A dispute
then arose as to whether the action was governed by the applicable Ohio
statute of limitations (by which measure it was timely) or the Kentucky
298 K.R.S. § 413.320 (Michie 1992).
299 Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1965).
" See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964) (construing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1994)).
30 T-Birds, Inc. v. Thoroughbred Helicopter Serv., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 548 (E.D.
Ky. 1982).
301 See id. at 549; 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1994).
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statute of limitations (by which it was time-barred). With a transfer based
upon the fact that Ohio could not have served as a forum, it was clear that
Kentucky's conflicts laws applied to the action. While the court concluded
that Kentucky law applied so that the action was time-barred, there was no
reasoning given as to why that was concluded.30 3 The result is correct and
the reason which should have been stated is the Kentucky borrowing
statute.3 4 Under that statute, it has clearly been held that Kentucky's
shorter statute of limitations will bar actions which are otherwise timely in
the place where they arose.3°5
Similarly, in Martin v. Stokes,31 a Virginia resident was injured in
Kentucky in an automobile accident when her vehicle was struck by a
vehicle owned by a Kentucky resident and driven by a California resident.
Suit was commenced in federal court in Virginia and transferred to federal
court in Kentucky, but the basis for that transfer was not stated by the
transferor court.07 Under Virginia choice of law rules, the action would
have been timely under a two-year statute of limitations; under Kentucky
choice of law rules, the action would have been time-barred under a one-
year statute of limitations. Thus, the question of which state's choice of law
rules were to be applied was determinative of the proper resolution of the
case. In an action transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the choice
of law rules of the transferor court are to be applied.3 8 Although not as
clear, the difference between such transfers and those pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406 made it likely that in such a situation the choice of law rules of the
transferee state would be applied °.3 Thus, it was necessary for the Sixth
Circuit to remand this action to the district court to determine the basis for
the transfer from Virginia.310 Given that one of the defendants in the action
was a Kentucky resident and that the accident occurred in Kentucky, it
seems far-fetched to think that Virginia actually had personal jurisdiction.
Thus, one may speculate that this was a § 1406 transfer, in which case
303 See T-Birds, 540 F. Supp. at 550.
314 See K.P.S. § 413.320 (Michie 1992).305 See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
306 Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980).
307 See id. at 470.308 See id. at 471 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964)).
31 It would be nonsensical to apply the transferor's choice of law rules in a
§ 1406 transfer since the transferor, by definition, was not able to serve as the
forum. See CHARLEs A. WlRIHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION 2D § 3846, at 364-66 nn.25-26 (1986); see also Phillips v. Illinois
Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1989).310See Martin, 623 F.2d at 473.
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Kentucky's choice of law rules would apply and the action would be time-
barred.
In a similar case, Carson v. U-Haul Co.,3 ' Georgia residents were
injured in an accident in Kentucky. Also involved in the accident were a
Kentucky driver, a Kentucky corporation with its principal place of
business in Tennessee, and an Oregon corporation with its principal place
of business in Oregon.312 The injured parties filed suit in federal court in
Georgia, but the matter was transferredto Kentucky following development
of a personal jurisdiction argument by the corporations and before process
could be served on the Kentucky driver.3 13 The transfer was made at the
insistence of the plaintiff Georgia residents. The action was brought within
a two-year time period set by Georgia law but outside the one-year time for
such actions set by Kentucky law.314 Rather than hold that the transfer had
been made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (because Georgia hadno personal
jurisdiction over at least some of the defendants), the Sixth Circuit treated
the case as one transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), but at the insistence
of the plaintiffs rather than the defendants.1 5 In those circumstances, the
court was able to reach a body of law (applicable at that time but since
overruled) which suggested that the choice of law in such transferred cases
was governed by the choice of law rules of the transferee court rather than
the transferor.316 In the modem era, such a ploy would not work because of
the holding of the United States Supreme Court that in 1404(a) transfers,
the choice of law rules of the transferor state apply regardless of who
initiated the transfer.31 7 The result remains correct, however, because the
transfer surely was under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, so that reliance upon Kentucky
31 Carson v. U-Haul Co., 434 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1970).
312 See id. at 917.
313 While the corporations might ultimately have proved to be doing business
in Georgia and thus subject to personal jurisdiction therein (assuming a general
jurisdiction long arm statute rather than a specific jurisdiction statute), there is no
conceivable manner in which the Kentucky driver would have been subject to
personal jurisdiction except by waiver or personal service while physically in the
state.
3 4 See Carson, 434 F.2d at 917.315 See id. at 918.
316 The court thus distinguished the case from Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S.
612 (1964), so as to avoid the holding of that case that the choice of law rules of
the transferor court applied. Van Dusen had been transferred at the insistence of the
defendant rather than the plaintiff. See Carson, 434 F.2d at 918.
317See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 520-21 (1990).
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choice of law to apply the Kentucky statute was required and the action
was time-barred.1 8
The reported federal decision which most closely resembles the typical
Kentucky statute of limitations cases is Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing
Co. 319 There, a Virginia resident was injured in Virginia by a machine
manufactured by a Kentucky corporation and shipped to Virginia.32 ° The
injured Virginian began an action in Kentucky more than one but less than
two years after the injury. Under the applicable Kentucky statute of
limitations, the action would have been time-barred; under the applicable
Virginia statute, the action would have been timely.321 Thus, the issue of
which statute of limitations applied was dispositive of the outcome.
Naturally, the decision had to be made under Kentucky choice of law
principles since the action had been filed in Kentucky. Under the decision
of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Seat, the Kentucky statute of
limitations was applied and so the action was time-barred.3z
The cases as a group clearly demonstrate the result of application of the
shorter statute of limitations under Kentucky choice oflaw principles. Only
in federal cases transferred to Kentucky but governed by another state's
choice of law rules is another result possible.
B. Tort Cases
1. Guest Statutes
Given that the classic Kentucky tort cases all arise in the context of
guest statutes, it is surprising that the reported federal case law has had so
little experience with the issue raised thereby.
In Bennett v. Macy," a Kentucky resident was injured in Indiana while
a passenger in a vehicle driven by an Indiana resident. Suit was then
brought in Kentucky and the driver defended based on the Indiana guest
statute. 24 In reaching the conclusion that Kentucky's law (which lacked a
guest statute) applied, the court relied exclusively upon Wessling to
318 See Carson, 434 F.2d at 917.
319 Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1967).320 See id. at 762.
321 See id. at 763.
" See id. (citing Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky.
1965)).
3 Bennett v. Macy, 324 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971).324 See id. at 410.
1998-991
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
conclude that Kentucky had the more significant relationship to the parties
and the events .35 Although the facts are actually much closer to Foster3 26
than to Wessling, the court couldnot have relieduponFosterbecause it had
not yet been decided. We know from the result in Foster that the court
correctly found that Kentucky law applied. What is surprising, however, is
that the court relied upon the "most significant relationship" analysis rather
than on the "sufficient contact" analysis which had been articulated three
years earlier in Arnett.327 One would have thought that the later analysis
made the choice easier for the court to conclude that it was looking at a fact
pattern in which Kentucky had an interest (the injured party was a
Kentucky resident) and that alone was sufficient. It is possible, however,
that the court could not see the usefulness of Arnett because the Arnett
accident had occurred in Kentucky; it is only with the application of the
analysis to the out-of-state accident in Foster that the pattern actually
became clear.
Certainly the result in Bennett is correct, but extreme care should be
used in citing it as authority for anything but its result. The Second
Restatement reliance may have been shown by Foster to be misplaced,32
unless Professor Reese's characterization of Foster as a "close case,' is
more prescient than one would think he could have known. Bennett
arguably supports the position that even the result in Foster is consistent
with the Second Restatement.
2. Wrongful Death
The classic conflicts rule for wrongful death was that such actions were
governed by the law of the place of the injury causing death; that classic
position is presumptively retained by the SecondRestatement.329 Care must
always be taken to note that the rule does not necessarily look to the place
where death occurs. One can easily envision cases where an injury occurs
in one state but death occurs thereafter in some other state.
A major Sixth Circuit pronouncement on Kentucky conflicts rules as
applicable to wrongful death occurred in Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc.330
3 See id. at 410-11 (citing Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967)).
326 Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
327 See id. at 828-29 (citing Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968)).
3' Even this may not be as clear as Justice Reed believed in his dissent to
Foster. See id. at 830-31 (Reed, J., dissenting); Reese, supra note 34, at 373.329 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175 (1971).
33' Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 712 F.2d 1069 (6th Cir. 1983).
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There, an Ohio resident employee of Harris was killed in an airplane crash
in Kentucky. Harris brought suit against the air carrier, the manufacturer
of the aircraft, and manufacturers of certain component parts.33 The
employer sought to recover against the alleged tortfeasors for the death of
the valued employee. Although it had been conceded at trial by all parties
that such an action for wrongful death was governed by the law of
Kentucky,332 the Sixth Circuit itself reasoned that Kentucky law would
apply, upon the basis that Kentucky's prior conflicts cases indicated that
Kentucky wished to apply its own law whenever possible,333 and further
noted that the mere fact that the accident occurred in Kentucky was
"sufficient to justify application of Kentucky law."334 The Sixth Circuit
went still further, however, and noted that a recent Kentucky decision,
Breeding, stood for the proposition that Kentucky would apply its own law
in a case of sufficient contacts, even if the parties had chosen to the
contrary.335 The Sixth Circuit thus overlooked36 Breeding having been a
contract case (and thus possibly subject to the Second Restatement) and
concluded that it stood as further evidence that "Kentucky applies its own
law unless there are overwhelming interests to the contrary.1337 That noted,
the court then addressed the problem for the employer, which was that
Kentucky law did not provide for such a right by an employer. The Sixth
Circuit (as had the district court) refused to create a new cause of action,
reasoning that Kentucky courts would choose to marshal the normally
limited assets of tortfeasors in favor of survivors rather than employers.338
Thus, Kentucky law was applied but to no avail for the employer, the result
331 See id. at 1070.
332 See Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1168 (E.D. Ky. 1981), afJd,
712 F.2d 1069 (6th Cir. 1983).
333 See Harris Corp., 712 F.2d at 1071 (citing Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d
827 (Ky. 1972); Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Wessling v.
Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967)).
334 Id. at 1071.
335 See id. (citing Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633
S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1982)). Thus, Breeding's sub silentio treatment of the choice of
law clause was viewed as significantly by the federal court as we have previously
observed in the state cases.
336 Or perhaps the oft-supposed distinction between tort cases and others is
irrelevant (or nonexistent) ifwe take Breeding's holding as having been what it did
rather than what it said. The Sixth Circuit apparently ruled based upon the result
rather than the language.
337 Harris Corp., 712 F.2d at 1071.339 See id.
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being the same as would have been reached under Ohio law and arguably
rendering Harris a false conflict with no difference between the law of the
two states.
A similarly novel argument attempting to secure damages for wrongful
death was advanced in Johnson v. S.O.S. Transport, Inc.339 In that case, a
Kentucky resident was killed (apparently in North Carolina340) while
driving a vehicle which had been leased to an Ohio corporation operating
as a common carrier of freight upon the interstate highways. The Kentucky
survivor of the decedent filed an action in Kentucky seeking damages from
the lessor for having been negligent in the inspection and maintenance of
the leased vehicle, thus contributing to the death of the Kentuckian.341 The
Kentucky driver had departed from his home in Kentucky, driving the
truck, and picked up a load of freight in Ohio.342 Thus, the decedent's trip
began in Kentucky and was intended to have ended in Kentucky after
delivery of the goods to North Carolina .3 3 The survivor sought recovery on
the theory that the lessor had a duty to maintain the leased vehicle in a safe
condition and that breach of that duty had contributed to the death. The
Sixth Circuit concluded, as had the district court, that any such substantive
duty would have to arise under Kentucky law, that being the law which
would be dictated by Kentucky's choice of law rules. That conclusion was
based on nothing more than the statement that such rules "favor the
application of its own law whenever it can be justified."344 Absent some
better connecting factor, such as Kentucky being the place of the accident
which caused the death, it is actually difficult to conceive how Kentucky
law could apply to the duty of a nonresident lessor who apparently
performed no acts in Kentucky other than dealing with the vehicle's owner,
who in turn hired the decedent. The issue turns out to be of interest only in
that abstract, however, since the court concludedthat Kentucky law didnot
9 Johnson v. S.O.S. Transp., Inc., 926 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1991).
The opinion is unclear on this point. After describing certain events which
occurred in Ohio and Kentucky and noting that North Carolina was the intended
destination, the Sixth Circuit noted that the decedent "Was killed while en route to
High Point, North Carolina." Id. at 518.
341 See id.
342 See id.
343 For the significance of Kentucky as the place where a trip began and was to
have ended, see Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972), and Wessling v.
Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
31 Johnson, 926 F.2d at 519 n.6 (citing Grant v. Bill Walker Pontiac-GMC,
Inc., 523 F.2d 1301, 1304 (6th Cir. 1975)).
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have any such substantive basis to furnish a claim against the lessor.345
Thus, a choice of law was made unnecessarily, there apparently having
existed no real basis to impose liability on the lessor.31 Again, Kentucky
law was applied but to no avail for the party-plaintiff, perhaps meaning that
there was no real difference in the law of the two states and that the facts
represented a false conflict.
Still another novel wrongful death theory was advanced in Vaughn v.
United States, in which suit was brought in Kentucky against the United
States arising from the death of two Kentucky residents who were killed by
a person with a long and dangerous criminal history.348 That perpetrator
was free from Ohio state custody because of his cooperation with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.349 Survivors of the deceased Kentucky
residents claimed that the United States had been negligent in allowing the
killer to be freed, thus rendering the United States liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). 350 FTCA claims are governed by the law
(including conflicts laws) of the state where the act or omissions
occurred.35' There was a small difficulty posed in this case because, while
most acts occurred in Kentucky, at least one act also occurred in Ohio. 52
Thus, the Sixth Circuit needed to determine whether the FTCA required
application of Ohio or Kentucky choice of law rules. The court avoided
having to reach that issue by finding that it did not matter-either state's
choice of law rules would apply Kentucky law to the merits ofthe litigation
because Kentucky was the place ofthe injury which caused death.353 While
345 See id. at 521.
31 The case was actually remanded for further proceedings because of the
possibility that recovery could be based on disregard for certain federal safety
standards applicable to interstate carriers. See id. at 524. Kentucky state law,
however, was foreclosed.347 Vaughn v. United States, No. 96-6336, 1997 WL 809911 (6th Cir. Dec. 16,
1997). This is an unpublished opinion of the Sixth Circuit. According to Sixth
Circuit Rule 24(c), the opinion cannot be cited for precedential value except in very
limited circumstances. It is included in this discussion for informational purposes
only.348 See id. at *2.
-49 See id.
350 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1994). The Actbasically provides thatthe
United States may be found liable ifa private person would have been found liable
for actions in the state where such actions occurred.
311 See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1962).352 See Vaughn, 1997 WL 809911, at *2.353See id. at *3 n.2.
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an easy enough solution existed under these facts, the court's analysis
clearly reveals that more difficult circumstances could arise. In concluding
that Ohio rules would require Kentucky law, the court noted that Ohio
applied the SecondRestatement and would find that Kentucky hadthe most
significant relationship. 54 In sharp contrast, the court was clearly aware
that Kentucky would choose its own law because the mere fact ofthe injury
having occurred in Kentucky was sufficient contact 55 One can easily
envision other situations in which Kentucky would have "sufficient"
contacts, but not the "most significant" contacts.356 Ultimately, no recovery
was awarded for the facts present in this case.
3. Fraud
The normal Second Restatement position on claims by persons
damaged by fraudulent conduct is that if the person has acted in reliance
upon misrepresentations, with that reliance occurring in the same state
wherein the representations were made, then that state's law should govern
the rights and liabilities of the parties.357 That seems a clear enough
solution, with the more difficult cases being those in which misrepresenta-
tions occur in one state but the reliance occurs elsewhere.
The federal experience with such torts has apparently involved only the
more simple fact pattern. In Tractor & Farm Supply, Inc. v. Ford New
Holland, Inc.,358 Tractor was a dealer for Ford New Holland, a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan, at a Kentucky
location pursuant to a franchise agreement which contained a Michigan
choice of law clause. Ford canceled the agreement and placed the franchise
with a new dealer. As a result, several Tractor employees left to work for
the new dealership. Tractor filed suit against Ford for breach of contract
and fraud. As noted elsewhere in this Article,359 Ford argued that Kentucky
law should apply to the contract dispute rather than Michigan law as was
31 See id. (citing Kurent v. National Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc., 581
N.E.2d 533 (Ohio 1991)).
3 5 See id. (citing Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972)).
356 The fact pattern that easily comes to mind is Foster, 484 S.W.2d at 827, in
which most commentators would say that Kentucky's contacts, while sufficient,
were not the most significant. See id. at 829.
35 7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148 (1971).358 Tractor & Farm Supply, Inc: v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1198
(W.D. Ky. 1995).359See supra notes 291-97 and accompanying text.
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called for under the contract which Ford drafted.36 The court upheld the
choice of law clause and applied Michigan law to the contract claims in the
matter.161 In sharp contrast, the court easily found that it would apply
Kentucky law to Tractor's claims of fraud and misrepresentation. 362 Indeed,
the issue must have been quite clear to the court because it cited no
authority. One can easily conclude from the prior Kentucky state court
cases that a Kentucky resident damaged by wrongful conduct which
occurred and had its consequences within Kentucky would be entitled to
the protections of Kentucky law, so no extended discussion is necessary.
One should also note the consistency of the result with the Second
Restatement position despite the case having been a tort action rather than
a contract action.
4. Damages/Persons Responsible
In both the modem era and under prior choice of law systems, it is
normally thought that the measure of damages in an action will be
governed by the same law which otherwise governs the underlying rights
and liabilities of the parties.363 That same law is normally thought also to
govern the availability of contribution among joint tortfeasors364 and
whether one person may be held vicariously responsible for the tort of
another. 65 These issues have arisen more commonly in the Kentucky
federal experience than in the state case law in the modem era but serve to
illustrate these basic principles.
Hinton v. Hoskins36 concerned an automobile accident in Kentucky in
which liability was clear and damages caused to a third party were agreed
upon, but in which the defendants undertook to secure a determination
between themselves of responsibility for the claim.367 One defendant
(Sizemore) was the operator of a tractor-trailer leased to the other
defendant (Aetna Freight). Under the lease, Sizemore furnished the
equipment and driver, receiving seventy-five percent of the gross fees;
360 See Tractor, 898 F. Supp. at 1202-03.
361 See id. at 1203.
362 See id.
363 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175 (1971).
364 See id. § 173.
365 Seeid. § 174.
366 Hinton v. Hoskins, 411 F. Supp. 282 "(W.D. Ky. 1976).367See id. at 283.
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Aetna received the remaining twenty-five percent of the fees.368 If, at the
end of a trip taken upon the business of Aetna, Sizemore did not receive a
directive from Aetna for additional work, his truck returned empty to its
home base in Ohio and Sizemore received no fee for such return.3 69 In the
case at hand, Sizemore's driver made a delivery in Mississippi and had no
immediate load thereafter. Sizemore contended that his driver was directed
to an Aetna terminal in Tennessee and was traveling back to Ohio from this
location when the accident occurred in Kentucky; thus, Sizemore con-
tended that his driver was acting within the scope of an agency relationship
with Aetna at the time of the accident. 30 Aetna contended that Sizemore's
driver was acting upon Sizemore's business at the time and that there was
no agency relationship at that moment 7.3 1 Thus, Sizemore alone was
responsible for the accident. 72 While it might appear that the issue between
the parties was one of contract law governed by the terms of the lease, the
court concluded that what was really at issue was more in the nature of a
tort claim generated by damage to a third party because the contract hinged
liabilityupon whose agent the driverwas at the time: Aetna's intheprocess
of following Aetna directives or Sizemore's returning empty to the home
base. 73 As to the status of that agency relationship, the court found that
Kentucky law should apply because under modem Kentucky confficts
law,374 Kentucky law would apply because the mere fact of the accident
happening in Kentucky was a sufficient contact. 75 Under Kentucky law,
the court concluded that the driver was acting at the time of the accident
only as an agent for Sizemore and thus that Aetna had no liability for the
damages.376 While there is no mention of the Second Restatement or
discussion of why Kentucky law applied (other than it being the place of
the accident), the result is consistent with the Second Restatement which
provides that issues of vicarious liability for the torts of others should be
governed by the law chosen to govern the underlying tort claim between
368 See id.
369 See id.
370 See id. at 283-84.
371 See id. at 283.
372 See id.
373 See id. at 284.
314 See id. (citing Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Arnett v.
Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky.
1967)).
375 See id.
376 See id. at 284-85.
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the tortfeasor and the victim.3" Under Arnett, the Kentucky courts would
choose to apply Kentucky law to the underlying personal injury claim to
the third party, and thus Kentucky law should govern the issue ofresponsi-
bility via agency.
Grant v. Bill Walker Pontiac-GMC, InC 78 arose when a Kentucky
resident was killed in an accident in Kentucky involving a vehicle driven
by a resident of North Carolina. Neither the North Carolina driver nor his
employer was the owner of the vehicle he was driving.3 79 That vehicle had
been procured in Michigan with the assistance of a Georgia automobile
dealership, which held title to the vehicle at the time of the accident and
intended to transfer title to the driver's North Carolina employer.38° For
purposes of accepting delivery of the vehicle in Michigan, the Georgia
dealership had appointed the driver its agent, and he was thereafter to drive
the vehicle to North Carolina.381 Since the action involved the death of a
Kentuckian in an accident in Kentucky, the Sixth Circuit correctly
concluded that issues arising from that deathwould, underKentucky law,3 2
be controlled by the law of Kentucky.383 Although that much is clear, the
issue in the case was made more complex by the fact that what the
Kentucky decedent's representatives actually sought was a recovery against
the Georgia dealership, with the agency relationship which was created to
facilitate delivery of the vehicle being a basis to hold it vicariously
responsible for the tort of the driver.384 As part of that argument, the
decedent's representative argued that title to the vehicle was still with the
Georgia dealership because under North Carolina law, title could not pass
until there was registration of the vehicle in North Carolina.385 The Sixth
Circuit assumed such to be the case as to the technical title of the vehicle
but held nevertheless that there was no liability because Kentucky law
governed such liability and ownership alone was not a sufficient basis to
377 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 174 (1971).
378 Grant v. Bill Walker Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 523 F.2d 1301 (6th Cir. 1975).
379 See id. at 1302.380 See id. at 1303.
381 See id.
382 The court cited Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968), which
supports the conclusion because the need to apply Kentucky law to the death of a
Kentucky resident is clearly greater than the need to apply it to a nonresident's
death, which was the case inArnett. See id. at 109-10.
383 See Grant, 523 F.2d at 1304.
384 See id. at 1304-05.
385 See id. at 1304.
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impose such liability.3 6 With title eliminated as a basis for liability, the
issue in turn depended on Kentucky law as to the agency issue. Kentucky
law was chosen upon the basis that it clearly governed the underlying tort
liability of the driver and that vicarious responsibility for his actions was
similarly governed by Kentucky law.387 The Sixth Circuit concluded that
the agency relationship had existed for purposes of signing for the vehicle
at the factory in Michigan but that thereafter the driver was not acting
under the control or upon the business of the Georgia dealership, so that it
had no liability under Kentucky law for the death caused by the North
Carolina driver of the vehicle.388
The related issue of contribution among joint tortfeasors was faced by
the Sixth Circuit in Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc. 389 In Harris Corp., the
employer of an Ohio resident who was killed in an air crash in Kentucky
sought to recover from the air carrier, the manufacturer of the aircraft, and
manufacturers of certain component parts for workers' compensation
benefits paid to the employee's survivors under Ohio law. The employer
was forbidden to gain such recovery under the law of Ohio.3" The
employer argued that under modem Kentucky conflicts jurisprudence
applicable to tort cases,391 it should be entitled to the application of
Kentucky law. Unlike the district court opinion,392 the Sixth Circuit did not
obviate such an argument by concluding that even under Kentucky law the
employer had no right to recover for such benefits. Apparently acting upon
the assumption that the choice of law between Kentucky and Ohio would
alter the outcome of the case, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Ohio law
rather than Kentucky law was to be chosen under applicable Kentucky
conflicts principles.3 93 Seemingly oblivious that Breeding demonstrated an
attempt to choose Kentucky law whenever possible or unless there are
overwhelming interests to the contrary, the court at least implied that
386 See id. (citing Wolford v. Scott Nickels Bus Co., 257 S.W.2d 594 (Ky.
1953)).
387 See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 174
(1971)).
388 See id. at 1304-06.
389Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 712 F.2d 1069 (6th Cir. 1983).
390 See id. (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.82 (Anderson 1998)).
391 See id. (citing Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Anett v.
Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968)).392 See Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1168 (E.D. Ky. 1981), affid,
712 F.2d 1069 (6th Cir. 1983).393See Harris Corp., 712 F.2d at 1072.
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Kentucky's conflicts jurisprudence in the contracts area (as exemplified in
Lewis andBreeding) made applicable an "interests or contacts analysis."394
The court interpretedLewis for the proposition that the state of contract
formation would control rather than the place in which an accident
occurred and distinguished those facts from Breeding by concluding that
in one case (Breeding) virtually all facts pointed to Kentucky law and inthe
other (Lewis) there were no facts indicating a connection to Kentucky for
the issue in question. The result seems, however, consistent with the
Second Restatement's position that the law which governs the underlying
merits of the claim governs contribution.395 Here, the party seeking
contribution did so not from facts relating to the death of the worker (i.e.,
the typical case of a contributing tortfeasor) but of the employment
relationship, which was centered in Ohio and undoubtedly governed by
Ohio law as demonstrated by the fact that the benefits were paid by the
employer pursuant to that state's workers' compensation law.
In contrast, in Adam v. LB. Hunt Transport, Inc.,396 members of an
Ohio family were involved in an automobile accident in Kentucky. One
member of the family was killed and the other two members were
injured.3 97 Suit was originally brought in Ohio but was transferred to
Kentucky pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406, due to a lack of personal jurisdic-
tion in Ohio over at least some of the persons or entities named as
defendants. 98 Thus, the federal court in Kentucky was obliged to apply
Kentucky's choice of law rules to issues arising in the case. As regarded the
wrongful death claim for the deceased Ohio resident, it was contended by
the plaintiffs that the claim should be governed by Ohio law, which
apparently allowed for recovery for "non-economic injuries," while the
Kentucky wrongful death statute allowed for no such recovery.39 Noting
Kentucky's abandonment of vested rights, the Sixth Circuit further noted
that Kentucky's choice of law rules showed an intention to apply Kentucky
law "if there are significant contacts-not necessarily the most significant
contacts-with Kentucky. ' " Drawing from its own opinion earlier in
Harris, the court further noted that "'Kentucky courts have apparently
394Id.
395 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 173 (1971).
396 Adam v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 130 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1997).
397 See id. at 221.
391 See id. at 221-22.
39 See id. at 230.
4
1 Id. (citing Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972)).
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applied Kentucky law whenever possible.' ,1o0 The court was thus able to
conclude that "because the Adams' accident occurred in Kentucky... [the
court] 'should' apply Kentucky law." ' This result is correct and could
more easily have been reached by the simple expedient of citing Arnett v.
Thompson 3 for the position that a claim asserted for the death or injury of
a nonresident arising from a Kentucky accident is governed by Kentucky
law.
The cases as a group demonstrate a clear adherence to two principles:
the application of Kentucky law whenever there are sufficient contacts and
assignment of liability among tortfeasors based upon whatever law governs
the merits of the action. It is important to recognize these principles
because situations in which the underlying merits are governed by non-
Kentucky law will not be governed by Kentucky law simply because
Kentucky serves as the forum.
Such a pattern is demonstrated byMcGinnis v. Taitano, in which the
plaintiff, a California resident at the time of the litigation, brought suit in
Kentucky against a Kentucky resident on a claim arising in Germany at a
time when both parties were in the United States military." There was no
dispute as to liability and the action proceeded upon the question of
damages. In the course of the damage litigation, the defendant wished to
introduce evidence of collateral source payments.0 The plaintiff contended
that the issue should be governed by Kentucky law, which made evidence
of such payments inadmissible, while the defendant relied upon German
law which he said would allow the admission of such evidence.4' 7
Recognizing from Arnett and Foster the pattern in Kentucky tort cases to
apply Kentucky law based on "sufficient contacts" rather than "significant
contacts" or "weighing of interests," the court concludedthat Kentucky law
could not apply to the facts at hand because (unlike the facts inArnett) the
accident did not happen in Kentucky and (unlike Wessling) neither of the
401 Id. at 231 (quoting Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 712 F.2d 1069,1071 (6th
Cir. 1983)).402 Id.
403Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
4o4 McGinnis v. Taitano, 3 F. Supp. 2d 767 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
4o5 See id. at 768.
41 In this case, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of disability pay-
ments received, apparently for the purpose of suggesting that the plaintiff was
malingering and not really hurt as badly as he was contending. See id.4o7See id. at 768-69.
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parties lived in Kentucky at the time of the accident.408 Although not saying
so, the court implied that the case presented a false conflict with only
Germany having any interest. Thus, any application of Kentucky law to
affect the outcome of the litigation on the merits would have violated due
process. After concluding that German law governed, the court then found
that the evidence was inadmissible anyway since German law was actually
the same as that of Kentucky. One may wonder in such cases whether the
result might more easily have been reached by foregoing the conflicts
analysis, proceeding directly to conclude that the law was the same in any
instance and then making the appropriate resolution.
5. Miscellaneous Torts
The tort cases available in state and federal court obviously do not run
the full gamut of all the torts which exist in the legal system. Nevertheless,
they run awide enough spectrum that they provide valuable information for
reaching conclusions about the Kentucky choice of law system being
applied in tort cases. Before leaving the area, however, it is necessary to
look at one rather strange tort case which provides some additional insight.
Kohn v. United States" involved a claim against the United States for
desecration of the corpse of a military policeman who was slain by a fellow
soldier at a base in Kentucky, where some of the various acts relating to the
corpse occurred.41' Although the family of the deceased policeman lived in
New York and could bring their action there under the Federal Tort Claims
Act,4" the acts in question all arose from the manner in which the
policeman's corpse was handled in Kentucky, the actions of the military
relating to the family and the burial in New York.4" 3 Under the Act (as
interpreted in Richards v. United States4 ), the trial court was required to
apply the whole law of New York to those acts occurring in New York and
the whole law of Kentucky to those acts occurring in Kentucky." Thus, a
408 Id.
401 See id.
4 10 Kohn v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), ajJd, 760 F.2d
253 (2d Cir. 1985).
41 See id. at 569.
412 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80 (1994).
413 See Kohn, 591 F. Supp. at 569.
414 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) (applying the law of the state
where the acts of negligence took place).4 1 SeeKohn, 591 F. Supp. at 572 (citing Richards, 369 U.S. at 11).
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portion of the opinion dealt with choice of law cases in Kentucky to
determine what law Kentucky would choose to govern the facts. The court
found (citing Foster) that Kentucky would choose to apply its own law to
tort issues "if there are any significant contacts with that state."4 6
Apparently concluding that such acts as wrongfullyperforming an autopsy,
embalming the body, and retention and cremation of certain body parts
occurring in Kentucky constituted a "significant contact," the court then
proceeded to apply Kentucky law.41 7 What is unfortunate about the case is
that there is absolutely no discussion of why these acts having occurred in
Kentucky is, taken alone, a sufficient connection. Perhaps one should
conclude from Arnett that if Kentucky's interest is activated by a nonresi-
dent injured therein, it must also be interested in wrongs committed to the
body of a soldier stationed in this state. While that may be true, one could
equally well point out that the persons who actually suffered were the
nonresidents and they suffered only vicariously from the Kentucky acts. In
any event, the case seems to continue the long pattern of applying




Similar to the Kentucky state court experience in Lewis418 with
uninsured motorists and issues of liability arising between tort victims and
their own insurer, the federal courts have encountered problems with
uninsured motorists and with tortfeasors who had liability insurance but
with limits inadequate to compensate their victims. The two areas are
sufficiently related that the experiences should be similar.
Quite similar to the Lewis facts, in Owens v. DeClark,4 19 the plaintiff,
a resident of Indiana, was injured in an auto accident in Kentucky while she
was a passenger in a vehicle covered by an Indiana insurance policy. A
dispute arose between the injured passenger and the insurer of the vehicle
4 16 Id.
417 See id.
418 Lewis v. American Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1977).
419 Owens v. DeClark, No. Civ. A. 94-265, 1995 WL 912492 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 7,
1995), aff'dsub nom. Owens v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 372 (6th
Cir. 1998).
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in which she had been a passenger as to whether that policy's underinsured
motorist coverage applied to the facts at hand. Under Kentucky law (as
argued by the passenger), coverage would have existed; under Indiana law
(as argued by the insurer), the facts did not activate an underinsured claim.
The court concluded that Indiana law applied, referring to Lewis and to the
Second Restatement as relied upon in Lewis.420 The result is undoubtedly
correct as the facts almost exactly mirror Lewis. Indeed, the court was
correct in seeing beyond "the significant relationship test" and correctly
stated that Kentucky's only contact was the location of the accident:
"merely a geographic happenstance. '2l Thus, like Lewis, the facts
presented a false conflict. There was no Kentucky interest to serve by
application of Kentucky law and any attempt to apply Kentucky law would
have violated due process.
In another quite similar situation, Hammer v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,4' the plaintiff driver (a resident of Indiana) of
an automobile was injured in an accident in Kentucky involving an
underinsured automobile driven by a Kentucky resident.42 Plaintiff was
covered by two policies of automobile insurance which included under-
insured motorist benefits and which had been issued in Indiana.424 The
driver contended that her ability to recover pursuant to underinsured
provisions of her insurance policies should be governed by Kentucky law,
which would have provided her higher benefits than Indiana law. The court
correctly chose to apply Indiana law, noting that Kentucky had faced an
identical situation in Lewis and citing with approval the result in Owens.'
As was true in both those cases, the facts in Hammer present a false
conflict, so that far from being the state with the most significant relation-
ship, Indiana was indeed the only interested state and the only available
choice.426
What Lewis, Hammer, and Owens seem to indicate as a group is that
disputes involving insurance coverage issued in other states will be
420 See id. at *2-3 (citing Lewis, 555 S.W.2d at 579).
421 Owens, 1995 WL 912492, at *2.
42 Hammer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Ky.
1996).423 See id. at 193.
424 See id.





governed by the law of other states. While it is tempting to look at the fact
patterns and wonderwhether some Kentucky compensation-orientedpolicy
might not be served in some instances by applying Kentucky law, it must
be kept in mind that the issue into which the courts are reaching is not
directly a result of the underlying tort. Rather, the issue arises from a
contract previously issued in another place, with the workings of that
contract now activated by a Kentucky accident. There is not a sufficient
Kentucky connection in these cases to allow application of Kentucky law.
At the same time, the results in the cases in no way detract from the
observed tendency of Kentucky to apply its own law whenever it has
sufficient contact to do so. As described, these cases lack sufficient
contacts.
2. Insurance Coverage Disputes
The disputes which have arisen from uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage are not dissimilar from another basic species of
insurance litigation-the coverage dispute. Given that similarity, the lessons
of the motorists insurance cases should hold true here as well.
In Security Insurance Co. v. Kevin Tucker & Associates, Inc.,427 a
Kentucky city contractedwith a Tennessee firm for design and construction
of a golf course. Dissatisfied with the work, the city filed litigation against
a member of the firm who had left the firm's employment, taking the
project with him.428 An insurance company had issued a professional
liability policy to that departing member. The insurer filed a declaratory
judgment action against the insured and the city, requesting a declaration
that its liability did not extend to the dispute between the city and the
professional.4" 9 Although the claim arose from unsatisfactory work on a
project in Kentucky, no one argued that Kentucky law governed the
contract dispute between the insured and the insurer.43 The Sixth Circuit
noted that in such contract cases, Kentucky applies the law of the state
"with the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties." 431'
427 Security Ins. Co. v. Kevin Tucker & Assocs., Inc., 64 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir.
1995).
428 See id. at 1004.
429 See id. at 1005.
430 See id. at 1003-05.
4311d. at 1005-06 (citing Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633
S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1982)).
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In the case at hand, the policy was issued in Tennessee to a Tennessee
resident through a Tennessee insurance agent by a carrier authorized to
transact business in Tennessee. 32 Thus, it was clear that Tennessee law
should apply. There is no doubt about the correctness ofthe result, and any
attempt to apply Kentucky law to such a dispute would doubtlessly have
violated due process in view of the clear lack of any Kentucky interest or
factual connection. One can only wish that the authority cited would have
been the Kentucky contract case so much more like the facts thanBreeding,
the clear authority is Lewis v. American Family Insurance Group.433
3. Life Insurance
While there are no reported Kentucky state court cases involving
conflicts issues on life insurance, it is not difficult to foresee that issues
may arise in which the laws of different states may arguably apply. Given
that most Kentuckians will likely be covered under policies issued in
Kentucky (even though by nondomestic insurers), conflicts should be
minimalbecause those carriers must be licensedto do business in Kentucky
andtheirpolicies must conform to the requirements of Kentucky law. Thus,
conflicts issues will most frequently arise in the case of persons who
already have policies issued elsewhere and who move to Kentucky.
Such a situation occurred in Blount v. Bartholomew.434 Following the
death ofaKentuckyresident, litigation arosebetweenpersons who claimed
to be entitled to the proceeds of a life insurance policy which the decedent
hadpurchasedwhile residing in Utah.435 The decedent originally designated
two persons as beneficiaries. While residing in Kentucky, the decedent
completed the necessary form to eliminate one of those beneficiaries but
died before the form was delivered to the insurer or its agent.43 6 Under
Kentucky law, the change form would have been effective although
undelivered, while under Utah law the original beneficiary continued to
have an interest until such time as the change form was received by the
insurer.4 37 The beneficiary who argued in favor of Utah law contended to
432 See id. at 1006.
3 Lewis v. American Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1977).
4
-4 Blount v. Bartholomew, 714 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Ky. 1988), aj'd, 869 F.2d
1488 (6th Cir. 1989).435 See id. at 253.
436 See id. at 253-54.
437 See id. at 254-55.
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the court that Kentucky, in contract cases, followed the "most significant
relationship" test as exemplified by Lewis.438 The litigant arguing in favor
of Kentucky law relied upon the pro-forum tort choice of law cases439 and
further arguedthat theLewis "most significant relationship" ideas hadbeen
abandoned inBreeding v. Massachusetts Indemnity & Life Insurance Co.' 0
That argument is extremely interesting because Breeding contained the
SecondRestatement language which had appeared in Lewis, but the litigant
was requesting the court to look at what Breeding essentially did, not at
what it said. The court agreed, stating that "'Kentucky applies its own law
unless there are overwhelming interests to the contrary.' "' As support for
that proposition, the court relied upon Hais42 -presumably that portion
of Harris relating to contribution rather than the purely tort portion of the
case, which involved the employer's attempt to recover for the death of a
valued employee. If it is correct that Kentucky is applying a "sufficient
contacts" analysis to tort cases and a "significant contacts" analysis to all
others, then the court missed the distinction and thus may have failed to
properly analyze the situation. Conversely, the Blount case may be a clear
demonstration that despite facial inconsistencies, there is no real difference
in Kentucky choice of law-the system applies forum law whenever there
are sufficient contacts to do so. Surely, Kentucky had an interest in
controlling the consequences of the attempt of its deceased domiciliary to
change his beneficiary, wherever the policy may originally have been
issued.
Kentucky law was similarly applied in Travelers Insurance Co. v.
Fields,"3 wherein a man, while he was a resident of Kentucky and married
to a Kentucky resident, obtained an insurance policy through his Ohio
employer.4" The insurance policy contained an Ohio choice of law clause.
At the time of securing the policy, the employee named his wife as a
431 See id. at 255 (citing Lewis, 555 S.W.2d at 579).
43 See id. (citing Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Arnett v.
Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky.
1967)).
"0 See id. (citing Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633
S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1982)).
"'Blount, 714 F. Supp. at 255 (quoting Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 712 F.2d
1069, 1071 (6th Cir. 1983)).
2 See id. (citing Harris Corp., 712 F.2d at 1069).
13 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Fields, 451 F.2d 1292 (6th Cir. 1971).
4See id. at 1294.
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beneficiary." 5 They were subsequently divorced in Kentucky and had a
property settlement agreement which was silent as to the wife's future
rights, if any, under the policy. The husband then remarried, moved to
Ohio, and died while married to an Ohio resident without having changed
the beneficiary designation from his first wife."' The insurer filed an action
in Kentucky against the first and second wives to determine to whom the
policy should be paid."7 At that time, it was clear that under Kentucky law
a Kentucky divorce extinguished a wife's rights in such apolicy, regardless
of whether the beneficiary designation was changed or not."8 Under the
law of Ohio, however, a first wife retained her rights under such a policy
until the beneficiary designation was changed." 9 Thus, for the Kentucky
ex-wife to prevail, she needed the law of Ohio to apply, and she based her
attempt to secure its application on the Ohio choice of law provision in the
policy. While recognizing that Kentucky would likely honor such a choice
of law clause,450 the court reasoned that the clause applied only to disputes
between an insurer and an insured. In the case at hand, the Sixth Circuit
believed that the issue was essentially whether the first wife's interest had
been "transferred," with no distinction to be drawn as to whether that
transferwas "voluntary" or "involuntary." Thusly characterized, Kentucky
was the law of the place of the "transfer," and the former wife's interest
therefore was governed by Kentucky law.45" ' It is worthwhile noting that in
this early application of Kentucky choice of law rules, the Sixth Circuit
readily relied upon the Second Restatement for authority in the context of
a contractual dispute, but the result reached was just like Kentucky's tort
cases-application of forum law. In all likelihood, a better solution would
have been to regard the issue as governed by principles of res judicata,
similar to the analysis previously noted for the decision in Cox v.
Harrison.4 52 Certainly the property settlement of the parties, which was
445 See id.
" See id.
447 See id. at 1293.
448 See id. at 1295 (citing, inter alia, Bissell v. Gentry, 403 S.W.2d 15 (Ky.
1966)).
" See id. (citing Cannon v. Hamilton, 189 N.E.2d 152 (Ohio 1963)).
450 See id. at 1296 n.4 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 192 (1971)).
451 See id. at 1298 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
209).




silent as to the effects on the life insurance, was incorporated by reference
into a Kentucky divorce judgment. It is only sensible to conclude that all
rights of the parties arising from that judgment were required by full faith
to be governed by Kentucky law. With Kentucky law providing that the
wife retained no interest after the entry of the decree, the only valid
conclusion would be that her rights to the policy were lost in the judgment.
Viewing the matter as a judgments problem provides an easier and more
clear-cut solution, albeit the same one reached by the court.
These two cases thus continue, in the contracts area, a discernible
pattern to cite to the SecondRestatement but to invariably reach results also
consistent with Currie, with forum law being chosen whenever there are
sufficient contacts to do so.
D. Perfecting Security Interests
In today's commercial economy, it is not unusual to see a party in a
state other than Kentucky extend credit to a Kentucky buyer or borrower
based in part on obtaining a security interest in property (real or personal)
located in Kentucky. In such circumstances, differences between the law
of the lender's state and Kentucky may present difficulties in perfecting a
security interest.
As an example, inln reMcGrew,5 3 aKentuckian purchased equipment
in Indiana from a seller whose financing branch took a security interest in
the equipment.454 The lender's security interest was properly perfected
under Indiana law by noting the lien upon the certificate of title."' Under
the law of Kentucky, where the buyer filed for bankruptcy, the security
interest should have been perfected by the filing of an appropriate Uniform
Commercial Code form in the county of the debtor's residence or place of
business. The bankruptcy court applied Kentucky law to determine that the
security interest was properly perfected. 56 The basis for so holding was
section 355.9-103(4) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which provided
that if a security interest was properly perfected elsewhere by notation on
a title, that state's law would govern the perfection of the security
interest.4 7 Thus, the provision of Kentucky's statutes was essentially a
4-1 In re McGrew, 20 B.R. 264 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
454 See id. at 265.41s See id. at 265-66.
456 See id. at 266-67.
417See id. at 265-67.
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legislatively mandated choice of law, and application of Indiana law was
correct under Kentucky law.
In contrast, a creditor was left in an unperfected position in In re
Towery.4 58 There, an Indiana creditor advanced credit to a Kentucky
borrower but failed to properly perfect its security interest under Kentucky
law.5 9 In an attempt to avoid being unsecured under Kentucky law, the
creditor argued that Indiana law applied to its perfection. Although it is not
clear from the reported decision, one may deduce that the Indiana
perfection mechanism upon which the creditor relied was not notation on
a title instrument, the method which was used in In re McGrew. Whatever
may have been the mechanism, the court found that it did not matter
whether Indiana or Kentucky law applied because under both laws the
creditor was unperfected." Thus, the case presented a false conflict in that
the results would be the same under the law of either state, with the creditor
being left in an unsecured status.
If the Uniform Commercial Code has succeeded in its goal to bring
uniformity in secured transactions, the need to make such choices should
be infrequent. In one of the two cases here observed, In re McGrew, the
existence of a statutory directive to apply another state's law obviated the
need for a judicial choice and thus does not impinge on the conclusion that
the Kentucky courts have generally tended to apply Kentucky law
whenever possible. Even in a Currie-based choice of law system, it is clear
that legislative directives on choice of law must be obeyed. In the other
observed case, In re Towery, there was no difference in the law of the two
states and thus no conflict.
E. Products Liability
Products liability cases do not actually present a unique category for
choice of law analysis. Traditionally, such fact patterns were approached
by characterizing them as breach of contract actions (i.e., breach of
warranty) or tort actions (i.e., negligence), with the modem theory of strict
liability possibly being some hybrid of both. While the label attached
would have been of obvious importance in the vested rights era, any
modem analysis with an emphasis on factual connections and interests will
411 n re Towery, 53 B.R. 76 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
45' See id. at 76-77.410 See id. at 76 n.1, 78.
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treat such actions pretty much the same no matter how labeled." The
modem experience of federal courts in Kentucky demonstrates these
principles.
In Rutherford v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,462 an Indiana resident
was injured in an automobile accident in Indiana when a Goodyear tire on
another driver's vehicle blew out, allegedly causing loss of control of that
vehicle and being a contributing factor to the accident. The tire was
manufactured in Kansas but placed upon the vehicle at a Ford Motor
Company plant in Kentucky. 3 It was clear that the action in question
would have been time-barred had it been brought in Indiana, but it was
timelyunderKentucky law.' Notingthe past Kentucky conflicts decisions
in tort casese5 and comparing them to the results in Breeding,6 the court
concluded that Kentucky law was 'not... in an entirely clear focus"467 and
further noted that the Kentucky cases had led to "confusion in Sixth Circuit
cases"" 8 which attempted to interpret the Kentucky law. As to the facts
before it, the court found that Kentucky had demonstrated no interest in
applying its law to actions arising from Kentucky products which caused
injuries elsewhere to non-Kentucky residents. Thus, the court found that
"Kentucky's true interest... is a minimal one,"" 9 going even further to
note that there was "not... sufficient reason to apply Kentucky law." '47
Indeed, the facts presented a false conflict in which there was no Kentucky
interest, and the court correctly rejected the attempt to secure the applica-
461 For a discussion of these principles, see Gunther Kuhne, Choice ofLaw in
Products Liability, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1972). Professor Kuhne argues in favor
of choosing the sufficiently connected law which is most favorable to the plaintiff.
See id. at 32.462 Rutherford v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 943 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Ky.
1996), aff'd, 142 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1998).
463 See id. at 791.
464 See id. at 790-91.
461 See id. at 792 (citing Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Arnett
v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Wessling v. Paris,417 S.W.2d259 (Ky.
1967)).
466 See id. (citing Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633
S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1982)).467 Id. at 792.
"6 Id. at792 n.3. The courtnoted particularly Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 712
F.2d 1069 (6th Cir. 1983), and Johnson v. S.O.S. Transport, Inc., 926 F.2d 516 (6th
Cir. 1991).
69 Rutherford, 943 F. Supp. at 792.
470Id. at 793.
[VOL. 87
CHOICE OF LAW IN KENTUCKY
tion of Kentucky law. Given that the issue involved the statutes of
limitations of the two states, one may wonder why the court could not have
solved the problem as easily by noting that a Kentucky court would have
(under Seat) applied the shorter Indiana statute of limitations to an action
which physically arose there.471
In Tatum v. HunterEngineering Co. ,472 a Kentucky resident was injured
while working on a piece of machinery at his place of employment in
Kentucky. His employer, a Kentucky corporation, had purchased the
equipment from a California manufacturer that later went out of business,
conveying some of its assets to a successor corporation.473 The lawsuit by
the injured employee was against the successor corporation. The crucial
issue in the case was the potential liability of such a successor.474 Under the
law of California, a successor was liable; under the law of Kentucky, a
successor was liable only if the transfer documents provided for a transfer
of such liability.4 75 What is interesting about the case is that the injured
Kentucky resident was having to argue in favor of application of California
law in order to get a more favorable rule for recovery, while the nonresi-
dent successorwas seeking to escape the law of its own state in favor ofthe
law of the state of the injury in order to be shielded from liability.476 These
facts are the converse ofwhat one normally finds in Kentucky, which tends
to be more liability-oriented than its sister states, particularly those that
border Kentucky. In this strange fact pattern, the injured resident read the
Kentucky tort conflict cases to indicate application of the law of the most
significant relationship, an apparent reference to the Second Restatement.
The nonresident successor, however, clearly had the easier argument, at
least on the face of Kentucky's cases. It pointed to the Kentucky location
of the accident as a sufficient connection, relying on Sixth Circuit
authority.477 The Sixth Circuit agreed, noting as it has before that "Ken-
tucky courts have shown a strong preference for application of Kentucky
law, whenever possible.' 78
471 See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text
472 Tatum v. Hunter Eng'g Co., No. 93-5526, 1994 WL 228236 (6th Cir. May 25,
1994). This is an unpublished opinion of the Sixth Circuit. According to Sixth Circuit
Rule 24(c), the opinion cannot be cited for precedential value except in very limited
circumstances. It is included in this discussion for informational purposes only.473 See id. at * 1.474 See id.
475 See id. at * 1-2.
476 See id. at *2.
4 1Id. at *2 (citing Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 712 F.2d 1069 (6th Cir. 1991)).
47 81d. (citingHarris Corp., 712 F.2d at 1071; Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem.
& Life Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1982)).
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What is missing totally is a recognition that the case presents a false
conflict, in which application of the Kentucky rule to protect the nonresi-
dent successor furthers no interest but does frustrate the basic Kentucky
tendency to try to compensate injured residents. Thus, it is a case in which
application of the Kentucky rule served no legitimate Kentucky interest,
while application of the California rule would have furthered a Kentucky
interest (compensation) and likely furthered a California interest (deter-
rence of negligent manufacture of products) as well. Indeed, one should
conclude that application of Kentucky law to this issue was violative of full
faith because Kentucky law was chosen over California law in the absence
of any Kentucky interest, and the result of that choice was destructive to
the rights of the Kentucky plaintiff. This appears to have been a classic
false conflict, missed by failure to analyze but decided erroneously upon
abstract statements out of context from the prior cases. It stands as a stark
example of one of the few instances in which another state was more
liability oriented than Kentucky, so that application of another state's law
would have best served a Kentucky resident while violating no Kentucky
interest. What blocked the court from reaching that conclusion was an
unfortunate reliance upon abstract statements and fact patterns, without any
analysis of the difference which variations in the law pattern may pose.
F. Professional Malpractice
The tort of professional negligence or malpractice does not really
present issues much different from other tort cases. Traditionally, such
actions might have sounded in either tort or contract, but the modem trend
is to treat them as their own species of damage action.479 For choice of law
purposes, the characterization in the modem era is less important than
analysis of the factual connections and state interests.
Typical of such cases is Kennedy v. Zeismann,80 in which a Kentucky
resident sustained damages during a medical proceaure, allegedly as a
result of the negligence of an Ohio physician in the course of an operation
at an Ohio hospital, which was also named as a defendant in the action.4"'
Although the plaintiff had been treated in Ohio, her initial contact with the
doctor was at an office the doctor maintained in Kentucky. Choice of law
"7 See, for example, the common treatment of nonmedical professional
negligence cases for statute of limitations purposes in K.R.S. § 413.245 (Michie
1992).
... Kennedy v. Zeismann, 522 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
481 See id. at 730.
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was of particular importance in the case because Ohio required medical
malpractice cases to be referred for arbitration482 while Kentucky allowed
a right to sue. Giving an extreme reading to the Kentucky tort cases,413
summarizing them as being in favor of application of Kentucky law, the
court concluded that its duty was to apply Kentucky law as to the merits of
any tort claim against a nonresident "over which it has personal jurisdic-
tion.' 84 That certainly applied to the doctor, whose actions in Kentucky
gave rise to personal jurisdiction. Although reserving judgment on whether
the hospital was subject to personal jurisdiction, the court hinted that the
defendant doctor might have been considered to be the hospital's agent
acting in Kentucky when he booked at his Kentucky office Kentucky
residents for surgery in Ohio.4s5 The case is an extreme example of a
forum-oriented choice of law system, holding that the ability to exercise
judicial jurisdiction is coextensive with the ability to exercise legislative
jurisdiction. It is also a departure from the normal choice of law which one
might expect under the Second Restatement, which would at least
preliminarily point to Ohio (the place of the injury) as governing the merits
of the litigation.486 Certainly the result seems correct in view of the holding
of the Kentucky courts in Foster,487 particularly as regards application of
Kentucky law to the doctor.
A similar result was reached in In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Securities
Litigation,48 an action pending in bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. A
Kentucky corporation which supplied items to Phar-Mor filed suit in
Kentucky against Phar-Mor's accountants, contending that the Kentucky
supplier relied upon negligently prepared financial statements in extending
credit. The supplier first sued in state court in Kentucky, and the action was
removed to federal court in Pennsylvania. Because the action had originally
been filed in Kentucky, the Pennsylvania federal court was called upon to
482 See id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Anderson 1992)).
483 See id. at 731 & n.3 (citing Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972);
Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d
259 (Ky. 1967)).484 Id. at 731.485 See id. at 731-32.
486 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1971).
487 See supra notes 40-45.
488 In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec.'Litig., Civ. A. Nos. 92-1938, 93-1643, 1995 WL
600240 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 1995).
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apply Kentucky choice of law rules.489 While all of the actions of the
accountants had occurred in Pennsylvania, the court noted that Kentucky's
courts would choose to apply Kentucky's own substantive law "whenever
possible.' ' 9 That was a conclusion reached from looking at two Kentucky
cases.4 91 Although viewing this Kentucky legal position as "highly
parochial," '92 the court thought that Kentucky's courts would seek to apply
their own law in all cases where they had jurisdiction. Given that the claim
against the accountants (Coopers and Lybrand) did not arise from any
actions in Kentucky, one might wonder whether Kentucky really had
personal jurisdiction under the Kentucky long arm statute. The question is,
however, likely meaningless because Coopers certainly did business in
Kentucky and likely had a registered agent with the secretary of state, thus
subjecting it to personal jurisdiction493 regardless of the long arm statute.
One can easily see Kentucky's desire to apply its own law to harm caused
to a Kentucky resident, regardless of the place where the conduct giving
rise to the harm had occurred.
As a pair, Kennedy and In re Phar-Mor continue the pattern of
applying Kentucky law whenever there are sufficient contacts and do so
without the sort of Second Restatement references seen elsewhere. Indeed,
In re Phar-Mor clearly implies that the result reached would have been
different had the Second Restatement (rather than Kentucky's "highly
parochial" conflicts rules) been applied. In rePhar-Morinparticularvoices
a concern over the forum-oriented choice of law rules of Kentucky. Indeed,
the results therein were bemoaned by the district judge, who noted how
clearly the result under Kentucky law differed from that reached in all the
other Phar-Mor litigation in which Pennsylvania law had led to summary
judgment for Coopers; the Kentucky choice of forum and attachment of
4 9 See id. at * 1 n. 1 (citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Crawford, 781 F.2d 39 (3d Cir.
1986)).
490 See id. at *2.
491 See id. at *1-2 (quoting Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972);
Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Ky. 1968)).492 See id. at *2.
493 One must infer that being subject to such jurisdiction meant being subject to
Kentucky's general jurisdiction because the claim clearly did not arise from
Coopers's actions in Kentucky, thus not activating Kentucky's specific jurisdiction
long arm statute, K.R.S. § 454.210(2) (Michie 1985). A corporation which has
appointed an agent pursuant to K.R.S. § 271B.015-050(2) has arguably become
more like a resident corporation than a nonresident corporation, thus subjecting
itself to general personal jurisdiction. See id. §§ 271B.015-.050(2) (Michie 1989).
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Kentucky choice of law rules was truly determinative of the outcome in the
case.
494
Nevertheless, the result in In re Phar-Mor at least is more defensible
under the Second Restatement than was the result in Kennedy. One must
keep in mind that in Kennedy, both the conduct and the injury occurred in
Ohio, which the Second Restatement would presumptively take to mean
that Ohio law should control the merits.495 In In re Phar-Mor, on the other
hand, the conduct occurred in Pennsylvania but the injury occurred in
Kentucky, in which case the SecondRestatementwouldpresumptively look
to the place of injury rather than the place of the conduct to control the
merits.496 While the court voiced an opinion in In re Phar-Mor that
Pennsylvania had the most significant relationship with all the accounting
malpractice claims arising from the Phar-Mor bankruptcy, one must
wonder whether that was caused more by a desire to make a single choice
of law for the mass of pending litigation than by the analysis necessary
under the Second Restatement. Thus, only Kennedy demonstrates for
certain a result which appears different than that which would apply under
the Restatement and (like Foster) its result is a good bit easier to defend
than the result in Arnett.497
G. Escrow Agents and Trustees
Written contracts and testamentary instruments occasionally cast upon
persons such as escrow agents ortrustees certain enumerated duties to other
persons. With disputes arising from whether such duties have been
appropriately performed, it may be necessary to determine which state's
law governs the duties of the escrow agents or trustees under the creating
documents. In such cases, it must be stressed that what is being sought is
not to impose liability upon the escrow agent or trustee (which action
would typically be some species of tort action), but rather a determination
ofthe manner in which the duties must be performed. There has been some
federal experience in Kentucky with such actions.
4 4In re Phar-Mor, 1995 WL 600240, at *2.
4 The possibility must be considered, however, that (like Foster) the result
might even be justifiable under the Second Restatement because of the "dual"
connection of the doctor to both Kentucky and Ohio. See supra notes 28-34 and
accompanying text (discussing this possibility in the context of Foster).
496 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 cmt. e (1971).497See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text
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In Guy v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.,498 a Kentucky bank
served as escrow agent for certain gas leases involving realty located in
New York. Upon compliance with certain contractual provisions with the
owners of those leases, certain persons were to receive those leases from
the Citizens Fidelity escrow.4 Citizens Fidelity refused to deliver and was
sued by the persons who had allegedly met their contractual obligations;
Citizens Fidelity interpleaded5° the owners of the leases.5 0' With the issue
before the court located in Kentucky being framed by the interpleader as
between persons contesting who was entitled to the leases, the Sixth Circuit
was obliged to apply Kentucky conflicts rules.0 2 Since Kentucky had no
connection to the litigation except as the place of business of the escrow
agent (who disclaimed any interest and simply wanted a direction as to the
party to whom delivery should be made), the Sixth Circuit concluded that
such a dispute was governed by the law of New York, that being the situs
of the realty in issue.03 There is no discussion in the case of the Kentucky
authority for such a position. It is apparent that Kentucky law could not
apply to any contract dispute which was as unconnected with Kentucky as
this. Any attempt to apply Kentucky law to affect the outcome of the
litigation on the merits would have been violative of due process and/or full
faith and credit because of the absence of any legitimate Kentucky interest.
Similarly, in Boyd v. LaMaster,'1 remaindermen under a trust created
by the will of an Illinois decedent filed an action alleging that assets had
been wrongfully transferredbythe trustee to anonbeneficiary. Those assets
had been transferred into a brokerage account in Kentucky, which account
was maintained for the benefit of a Kentucky resident. The court found that
the merits of the claims of the remaindermen were to be governed by the
law of Illinois since that was the state of the settlor's domicile at the time
of death. 05 This application of Illinois law was required by Kentucky
decisional law stating that the law of the settlor's domicile at death controls
disputes arising from the trust.5°6 Although the Sixth Circuit confirmed that
Illinois law would govern the merits of the claim, the court noted that the
... Guy v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 429 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1970).
499 See id. at 829.
500 This was not a statutory interpleader but pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 22.
501 See Guy, 429 F.2d at 829.
502 See id. at 832.
503 See id. at 829, 832.
5' Boyd v. LaMaster, 927 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1991).505 See id. at 238-39.
506 See id. at 239 (citing Santoli v. Louisville Trust Co., 550 S.W.2d 182 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1977)).
[VOL. 87
CHOICE OF LAW IN KENTUCKY
timeliness of the claim was to be governed by Kentucky law. In an
interesting twist on prior interpretations of Kentucky's borrowing statute,
the court found that Kentucky's own statute of limitations always governs
unless a claim arises "in another state or country.'507 The court noted that
both Illinois and Kentucky had five year statutes, "so it is the Kentucky
statute to which the... claims are subject."5°8 That conclusion may be
significant because, assumingthat statutes of limitations may have different
triggering events, being pointed to Kentucky's own statute may be
important even in cases where the statutes are facially the same as to
length.
The other very significant factor in the court's consideration of Illinois
as potentially supplying the statute of limitations is that it must have
concluded that the claim "arose" in Illinois. Given that the alleged
conversion of assets physically occurred in Kentucky, one can only
conclude that the concept of "arising" under the borrowing statute was
taken by the Sixth Circuit to refer to the jurisdiction furnishing the rule of
decision (i.e., Illinois) rather than to the place where some act physically
happened. °9 One can easily envision that being tremendously significant
in later interpretations of the borrowing statute. It should be noted that such
an interpretation of the "arising" concept of the borrowing statute seems
different from the Kentucky state decision in Ellis v. Anderson,1 ° where the
concept encompassed the physical location rather than the law governing
the merits.
The case is also illustrative of the issue-selecting approach taken in
modem conflicts cases, by which one issue may be governed by the law of
one jurisdiction and another issue governed by another state's law. Such
occurrences are not commonplace in the area of statutes of limitation, even
prior to the modem era, but are worth noting.
In Guy andBoyd, the underlying obligations of the parties were held to
be governedby non-Kentucky law in circumstances in which the Kentucky
connection to a party arose after the underlying transaction. Although
choosing not to apply Kentucky law to the merits of the two actions, both
are so lacking in factual contact as to have made any different result
impossible and thus are not at odds with the observed pattern of applying
Kentucky law whenever constitutionally possible.
507 Id. at 240 (citing K.R.S. § 413.320 (Michie 1992)).
508 Id.
509 See id. at 239-40.
5,0 Ellis v. Anderson, 901 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).
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H. A Pattern in the Federal Cases
An initial observation must be that the federal courts have had almost
twice as much experience as the Kentucky courts in attempting to apply
Kentucky's choice of law rules. There are thirty-seven 1' reported federal
decisions in the area, with fourteen of those related to "nonsubstantive"
choices (i.e., choice of forum or choice of law clauses) and the remainder
related to the classic conflicts situations requiring a choice between the
laws of different jurisdictions. It is also clear from the language in the
federal cases that the federal courts (at all levels and even in geographic
regions not commonly dealing with Kentucky's choice of law rules) find
them both confusing and highlyparochial. 12 Regardless of what the federal
courts may think about the Kentucky choice of law cases, they are required
to follow them. Thus, one may draw some conclusions about the content
of the Kentucky system from observing the attempts of the federal courts
to apply it to fact patterns, some of which have not yet been encountered
in the Kentucky state court experience.
In the nonsubstantive area of choice of forum and choice of law
clauses, the federal courts have on one occasion enforced a choice of forum
clause in favor of another state.513 They have on three occasions514 enforced
choice of law clauses in favor of states other than Kentucky. Although the
results appear consistent with the Kentucky state decisions, the federal
decisions are basically lacking in the analysis being applied in the later
Kentucky cases and in the "skeptical" eye toward such clauses which
appear to be present in state decisions. Nevertheless, the results themselves
are consistent with Kentucky law and the Second Restatement.
Looking to the substantive choice of law cases, the pattern is the same
as that observed in the Kentucky state cases-that is, application of
Kentucky law in all but a few isolated instances:
511 The number includes reported district court opinions which received
appellate decisions, although this Article has discussed such instances primarily as
indicated in the appellate courts.
112 See, e.g., In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., Civ. A. Nos. 92-1938, 93-1643,
1995 WL 600240, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 1995) (illustrating a federal court's
attitude toward Kentucky choice of law).
513 See Creditors Collection Bureau, Inc. v. Access Data, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 311,
312-13 (W.D. Ky. 1993).514 See WorldSource Coil Coating, Inc. v. McGraw Constr. Co., 946 F.2d 473
(6th Cir. 1991); Tractor & Farm Supply, Inc. v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 898 F.
Supp. 1198 (W.D. Ky. 1995); In re Velasco, 13 B.R. 872 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
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Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc."'5 Although Ohio law was applied to that
aspect of the litigation which was the employer's attempt to secure
contribution from other parties for the workers' compensation benefits it
had paid regarding the deceased employee, its ability to do so could in
reality only have been governed by Ohio law, which was the place of the
employment relationship. The case was a false conflict in which Ohio was
the only interested jurisdiction and an attempt to apply Kentucky law
would have been violative of due process.
McGinnis v. Taitano.1 6 Obviously, there was no ability for Kentucky
law to be applied to a claim arising in Germany between persons who had
no connection at all to Kentucky at the time of the accident which gave rise
to the claim. This was a false conflict in which there was no Kentucky
interest to be furthered and no ability constitutionally to have applied its
law.
Owens v. DeClark,1' Hammer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.,5" 8 and Security Insurance Co. v. Kevin Tucker & Associates,
Inc. 19 Each was an instance of a dispute between an insurer and an insured
arising under an insurance policy issued outside Kentucky but activated by
factual events in Kentucky. In these circumstances, there was no Kentucky
interest to be activated by applying Kentucky law, and any attempt to
impact insurance contracts entered into elsewhere would have been
violative of due process.
In re McGrew. 20 Although a decision was made to apply law other than
Kentucky's in a situation where Kentucky had an interest and Kentucky
law constitutionally could have been applied, such result was mandated by
Kentucky statute. 2 Thus, the result here was legislatively dictated, and the
Kentucky choice of law system would have to defer to such legislative
directives. We might conceptualize this case as one in which Kentucky
"law" actually was applied because Kentucky's statutes "incorporated by
"I Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 712 F.2d 1069 (6th Cir. 1983).516 McGinnis v. Taitano, 3 F. Supp. 2d 767 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
517 Owens v. DeClark, No. Civ. A 94-265, 1995 WL 912492 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 18,
1995), aff'dsub nom. Owens v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 372 (6th
Cir. 1998).
18 Hammer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Ky.
1996).
519 Security Ins. Co. v. Kevin Tucker & Assocs., Inc., 64 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir.
1995).
120In re McGrew, 20 B.R. 264 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
521 See K.R.S. § 355.9-.103(4) (Michie 1996).
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reference" the law of another state to validate an alternate means of
perfecting a security interest.
Rutherford v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.522 While the result
superficially appears to apply the law of a state other than Kentucky, that
result was in fact correct because of the Kentucky borrowing statute as
interpreted in Seat.523 Again, the decision to apply another state's law was
in fact in accordance with Kentucky's own policy.
Guy v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. 524 This was actually a false
conflict in which any attempt to apply Kentucky law would not have
furthered any Kentucky interest and in which an attempt to apply Kentucky
law would have been violative of due process.
Boydv. LaMaster.525 This was also a false conflict in which any attempt
to apply Kentucky law would not have furthered any Kentucky interest and
in which an attempt to apply Kentucky law would have been violative of
due process.
The results are thus identical to those encountered in the Kentucky state
cases. In virtually every instance where there was contact with Kentucky
sufficient to allow application of Kentucky law without violation of due
process, Kentucky law was chosen. The only "exceptions" to that pattern
are the legislatively directed choices of the law of another state, i.e.,
statutes of limitations under the direction of the borrowing statute and
another state's security perfection mechanism under a provision of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
Again, the choices appear for the most part to be consistent with the
results which would have been reached under the SecondRestatement. The
cases are not as consistent as the state cases in citations to the Second
Restatement, but the results match Kentucky's so as to comply with the
directives of Klaxon. These results reinforce the earlier observation that
however different Currie's theories may have been from the Second
Restatement thirty years ago, the passage of time and the gathering of
factual experience is proving them similar if not identical in result. Indeed,
with the benefit of that much hindsight, only Arnett stands out as a
certainly different result.526
5 Rutherford v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 943 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Ky.
1996), affid, 142 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1998).
" See Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 908, 909-10 (Ky.
1965).
524 Guy v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 429 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1970).
" Boyd v. LaMaster, 927 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1991).526 See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
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I. Tabular Depiction of the Pattern
If we place the cases, both state and federal over this thirty year span
of time, into tabular form, certain dramatic aspects are revealed. Attached
as Table l is a depiction of the state court decisions during that time period.
Table 1 depicts, in chronological order, the cases by name, the result (i.e.,
whether Kentucky law or the law of some other state was chosen), and
whether or not the Second Restatement was cited in the reported opinion.
Table 1 reveals:
The Kentucky state courts have chosen Kentucky law in all but ten of
the twenty-four reported cases.
That in two instances, Kentucky law was chosen when Kentucky
lacked a sufficient contact to satisfy due process. 27
In five of the instances when Kentucky law was not chosen, Kentucky
lacked sufficient contact to satisfy due process had it been chosen to govern
the outcome of the litigation on the merits. Hence, it was not constitution-
ally available as a choice.
In three of the remaining instances when Kentucky law was not chosen,
the failure to choose Kentucky law was based upon the parties' choice of
law clause or choice of forum clause. Thus, Kentucky law was simply
deferred to the choice of the parties.
In one of the remaining instances when Kentucky law was not chosen,
the choice of another state's law was legislatively directed by the borrow-
ing statute.
The sole remaining instance of choosing another state's law actually
involved deferring to a portion of a sister state judgment which involved an
equity decree and thus was not a true choice of law or decision to defer
Kentucky's interest.
The SecondRestatement of Conflicts has been cited in all but six of the
reported decisions, although in at least the instances of the early tort cases
(i.e.,Arnett andFoster in particular) the citation may have been as contrary
authority.
Two of the cases which do not cite the Second Restatement involve
very short opinions directly controlled by precedent which did in fact cite
the Second Restatement.
One of the remaining cases which did not cite the SecondRestatement
was making a "choice" in a setting where Kentucky law was identical to
527 1 am certain that my identification of Arnett and Layne as violative of due
process will come as a surprise. See the discussion, infra notes 540-48 and
accompanying text, for the support of that position.
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the nominally "competing" state law and hence no citation of authority was
really needed.
What is even more interesting (but not graphically depicted) is that the
cases not only cite the Second Restatement, they in fact reach results
entirely consistent with and supported by the SecondRestatement, with the
exceptions of Arnett, Layne, and (possibly) Foster. Thus, even the tort
cases (subject to those exceptions) are in fact consistent with the Second
Restatement.
One must draw some sort of conclusion from this, and I suggest there
are superficially two possibilities. The first is that Kentucky is choosing its
own law whenever it has sufficient contact to do so unless the parties or the
legislature choose to the contrary. Read in that fashion, the pattern is
classically Brainerd Currie and the citations to the SecondRestatement are
irrelevant: the cases hold what they do, not what they say. The second is
that Kentucky is applying the Currie system to tort cases and the Second
Restatement to all other cases. We have seen instances in both state and
federal cases where courts have had that perception and so stated. That is
an assessment which I have also heard from very skilled Kentucky
practitioners, who made the observation in a setting of purely academic
interest and not simply in furtherance of a client's position in a piece of
litigation.
Let me suggest a third possibility. I posit that with thirty years of
experience in making real, concrete, on-the-ground, fact-pattern-by-fact-
pattern decisions, the two "competing" systems are revealed not to have the
sorts of differences which they were perceived to have when the new era
was young and there was no experience. Consider how that might be so.
The basic theme of the Second Restatement was to build upon the First
Restatement. Even the harshest critics of the First Restatement on
theoretical grounds had to admit that surely it reached the correct result in
the vast majority of actual cases. The SecondRestatementbasically adopted
the First Restatement position on most issues and provided for an escape
analysis via the "Choice-of-Law Principles" of section 6.128 We might
identify those in shorthand as the recipe for how to tell when a state had a
"more significant relationship" than the one presumptively chosen by the
black letter sections. As one looks back, how could anyone really doubt
that sort of governmental interests (but without the pro-forum bias) of
Currie must inherently be within section 6, and particularly subsection 2(c)
of the Second Restatement?529 With that as at least a working hypothesis,
52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
529 
"[T]he relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue." Id. § 6(2)(c).
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let us take a look at the same tabular depiction of the pattern for the federal
cases.
Attached as Table 2 is the same sort of format, only for the federal
cases (bankruptcy, district, and circuit levels) arranged chronologically
from Atkins to present, and showing the same information previously
depicted for the state decisions. Here we find thirty-five reported decisions,
approximately fifty percent more experience than is available from the
Kentucky state courts over that time. Given the number of references we
have seen by the federal courts to their opinion that Kentucky law was
unclear or confusing, we might expect not to discern the same pattern. In
fact, however, that is not true and the most critical aspects remain. From
this table, one may conclude:
In only eleven of the thirty-five reported decisions have the federal
courts chosen to apply law other than that of Kentucky.
In seven of the instances when a law other than Kentucky was chosen,
Kentucky lacked a sufficient due process connection, so that Kentucky law
was actually a constitutionally unavailable choice.
In three of the remaining instances where Kentucky law was not
chosen, the choice of another law was a result of deference to a choice of
law clause. Thus, the choice was made privately by the parties and simply
honored by the court.
In the sole remaining instance of not choosing Kentucky law, the
decision to defer to another state's law was mandated by a portion of the
Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code. Thus, the choice was legislatively
mandated.
In sharp contrast to the Kentucky case law, in only six ofthe thirty-five
reported decisions was there a direct citation to the Second Restatement,
although there was language referring to the "most significant relationship"
in four additional cases.
Given the absence of significant citation to (much less reliance upon)
the Second Restatement, one might expect that the results would be
inconsistent with that document and solely in line with the Currie, pro-
forum analysis which appears in many of the cases, often in a complaining
or derogatory manner. In fact, that is not true. Viewed carefully, only three
cases (Bennett, Kennedy, and In re Phar-Mor), superficially at least, reach
different results than would have been reached under the Second Restate-
ment.10 The pattern here, when considered with the pattern in the state
decisions, is actually quite amazing and offers great possibilities for future
refinement of the conflicts process in Kentucky.
530 See supra notes 323-25, 480-97 and accompanying text.
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IV. TOWARD THE FUTURE
In reflecting upon this and my own twenty-five years of practice in
Kentucky, I think that it is time to recognize the reality of what is present.
For all the federal criticism of Kentucky's choice of law rules as parochial
or egocentric, the results are in truth quite mainstream. It is only the
semantics of "sufficient contacts" or applying Kentucky law "whenever
possible" that is making the system subject to such criticism. We could in
fact make a great stride forward if the Kentucky Supreme Court would
endorse the Second Restatement as our choice of law system. Researching
a conflicts issue has always been difficult, in large part because the West
Key Number System contains no comprehensive key for conflicts; all the
various areas of the law have component keys as to "law applicable," so
that performing comprehensive conflicts research is difficult. Even the
advent of electronic research tools has not totally cured that difficulty.
The Second Restatement is a desirable system for many reasons. First,
it builds into most of its black letter sections a vested rights preference
which properly reflects the realities of that prior system's merit, whatever
its intellectual shortcomings may have been. Second, it has emerged as the
plurality position among the various states, and endorsement would place
Kentucky within that group. Third, it would provide a research tool which
is otherwise lacking; the Second Restatement has black letter sections,
comments, and case compilations which facilitate research by practicing
attorneys and provide guidance for courts. Finally, express adoption of the
Second Restatement is no more than a recognition of what has already
occurred in fact if not in appearance. Getting to that conclusion will in
reality impact only two of the state court cases which appeared at first
blush to have different results from the Second Restatement." Those
apparently inconsistent results are worth revisiting as an illustration ofwhat
should be done. In the interest of clarity, let me look at the unaffected cases
which had results which had been thought to be different under Kentucky
law than would have been the case under the Second Restatement.
Foster v. Leggett32 (in the state system) and Bennett v. Macy533 and
Kennedy v. Zeismann" (in the federal system) all involve essentially the
same result. A Kentucky resident has been injured (or killed) in another
531 See Layne v. Layne, 433 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1968); Arnett v. Thompson, 433
S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); infra notes 540-48 and accompanying text.
532 Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
533 Bennett v. Macy, 324 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
5 Kennedy v. Zeismann, 522 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
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state by a non-Kentuckian who resides in the state in which the accident
has occurred. Sections 145 (injury) and 175 (death) of the Second
Restatement35 would presumptively point to the law of the state where the
injury occurred rather than Kentucky as governing the issues arising, yet
the three cases all applied Kentucky law. If the issue is so simple, why did
Professor Reese call Foster a "close case" and say that he would opt for
Ohio law only if forced to choose? The only reason anyone finds the cases
difficult is that the defendant in each has physically acted in his own
domiciliary state and caused an injury-the Indiana driver in Bennett, the
Ohio driver in Foster, and the Ohio doctor in Kennedy. But what the cases
really demonstrate is that the concept of domicile (with its inherent
singularity) as a connecting factor is simply too outdated for modem times.
The drivers in Bennett and Foster were both actually employed53 6 in
Kentucky and spent even their non-working hours at temporary quarters
despite remaining technically the domiciliaries of other states. The doctor
in Kennedy maintained an office in Kentucky, at which he regularly saw
patients and began the contact which resulted in him treating the aggrieved
patient in Ohio. If one would simply recognize that those sorts of defen-
dants in fact have meaningful connections similar to domicile in more than
one place, the cases are actually quite simple. If the defendants in those
cases had been Kentucky domiciliaries, the results in the cases (choice of
Kentucky law) would never have raised a doubt because the patterns would
be almost identical to Wessling, a result with which no system could
quarrel. What this demonstrates is that the presumption of the Second
Restatement in each of those cases should properly have been overcome by
recognition of the fact that Kentucky had a more significant relationship
than did the state where the physical events occurred. Thus, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky can give express approval to the Second Restatement
without having to disturb even the seminal decision in Foster, and the
federal precedents in Bennett and Kennedy would remain valid.
The result is less clear in In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Securities Litigation.57
The Pennsylvania federal court had chosen Pennsylvania as having the
most significant relationship in the case of other users of financial
statements prepared for Phar-Mor by Coopers but reluctantly applied
535 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 175 (1971).
536 A very forceful assertion of the virtual equality of place of employment with
residence or domicile is made in the plurality opinion inAllstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 314 (1981).
17 In re Phar-Mor, Inc. See. Litig., Civ. A. Nos. 92-1938,93-1643, 1995 WL
600240 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 1995).
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Kentucky law to a claim by a Kentucky creditor which allegedly relied
upon those statements in extending credit. Looking at the facts, however,
I am puzzled as to why the federal court thought that Pennsylvania in fact
had the most significant relationship. If one analogizes the claim to one for
personal injury, the SecondRestatement has a preference for the state of the
injury where action occurs in one state and damage in another. 8 In the
case of fraud or misrepresentation where such acts occur in one state and
are relied upon in another state, the Second Restatement has no clear
answer but shows a great deference to the state where the victim has relied
upon the statements. 39 Thus, it is not possible to say that the choice of
Kentucky law in this matter was incorrect, even under the Second
Restatement. Given the bankruptcy context in which the case arose, one
suspects a desire on the part of the district court to see the multitude of
accounting malpractice claims governed by the same law, but that really
may not be possible. For myself, I think the choice of Kentucky law in In
re Phar-Mor is correct under the Second Restatement, thus requiring no
adjustment in existing results to confirm reliance thereon.
And that leaves only two to be resolved: Arnett v. Thompson5 ° and
Layne v. Layne.541 We really should say one becauseLayne is nothing more
than an exact duplicate of Arnett, with no independent reasoning. And so,
what about Arnett? There is no stretch of anyone's powers which can make
the Second Restatement choose Kentucky law to apply to claims between
the Ohio passenger-wife and the Ohio driver-husband in order to obviate
a guest statute and spousal immunity. So we must conclude that its
overruling is necessary. I urge, however, that it not be done on what one
might think the obvious basis, i.e., that we are shifting to the Second
Restatement. Rather, I urge it be overruled because it is wrong-it always
has been. Let us reflect upon that fact pattern. It has always been assumed
(see the analysis infral2) that Arnett was a true conflict, that Kentucky had
some sort of interest in seeing health care providers paid when they gave
care to a nonresident tort victim or that Kentucky wanted to deter such
negligence on its highways. One will search the opinion in Arnett in vain
for any hint that the court of appeals thought that; the opinion says no more
than that Kentucky as the place of the accident is a sufficient basis to apply
s See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 cmt. e.
539 See id. § 148(2).0Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
541 Layne v. Layne, 433 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1968).
542See infra notes 543-48 and accompanying text.
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Kentucky law.-43 Since that time, commentators have imagined those
policies so as to explain the result, which was a "given" in their analysis.'
Kentucky had adopted interest analysis and chose its own law in Arnett;
therefore, a Kentucky interest-must have been present. Not true. There is
no evidence in the opinion about unpaid bills. Any thought that compensa-
tion deters nonintentional torts seems to fail virtually by definition.545 In
fact, Arnett was a false conflict in which there was no Kentucky interest to
be furthered by application of Kentucky law.
In fact, a very substantial argument can be made that application of
Kentucky law in Arnett was violative of due process. There is authority
from the United States Supreme Court that a state's attempt to apply its
own workers' compensation law to the death of a worker employed
elsewhere was violative of full faith and credit.5' Language in Bradford
certainly suggests that the forum was actually so lacking in factual
connection as to satisfy due process.-47 But for the historical baggage of
vested rights, one may reasonably question whether the place of the injury
inevitably has an interest in applying its law to every facet of every tort
claim which arises therein. The choice of Kentucky law based on the bare
connection of the injury has caused great mischief5 48 for our conflicts
543 See Arnett, 433 S.W.2d at 113.
144 One eminent conflicts scholar believed the result inArnett was even correct
because he believed (as I have argued regarding Foster) that the concept of
domicile was too simplistic and that the Arnetts had close enough ties with
Kentucky to be treated more as residents than nonresidents. See Russel J.
Weintraub, Finding a Substitute for the Place-of-Wrong Rule: The Kentucky
Experience, 61 KY. L.J. 419,424 (1972). Ifthat is factually correct, even this result
might be justified under the Second Restatement.
141 Professor Robert Sedler, then on the faculty of the University of Kentucky
College of Law, opined in his symposium piece regarding Foster that there was no
basis to find either of such policies to justify the result in Arnett. See Robert A.
Sedler, Judicial Method Is "Alive and Well" The Kentucky Approach to Choice
ofLaw in Interstate Automobile Accidents, 61 KY. L.J. 378,382 (1972).
546 See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1932),
overruled inpart by Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965).
s7 See id. at 162.
548 For an easy and tragically wrong example, see Tatum v. HunterEngineering
Co., No. 93-5526, 1994 WL 228236 (6th Cir. May 25, 1994). There, Kentucky law
was chosen to the detriment of a Kentucky plaintiff, and a nonresident corporation
was afforded a protection which it did not have under the law of its home state. See




jurisprudence, in intellectual quality if not in result. Let us simply face that
fact, lay Arnett to rest, and proceed forward with a materially more usable
system than we have had.
CONCLUSION
I am on the eve of leaving Kentucky after twenty-five years as a
teacher and practicing lawyer in this state. When I arrived in Kentucky,
Foster had only been decided two years earlier. Thus, I was physically
present here while this body of law developed. I must confess that I never
saw the pattern while it was in progress. I literally could not see this forest
because I looked too hard at the trees and particularly the earliest ones,
Wessling, Arnett, Foster, Lewis, and Breeding. I hope that seeing this
collected set ofjurisprudence will convince our bench and bar that a change
is in order and that it will be only the very slightest of a shift to give us a
more workable system. It would change the result in onlyArnett and would
provide the judiciary and the practitioners of this state with an invaluable
research tool and guide to what most find a difficult area of practice. That
small change in this mass of case law seems a small enough price to pay for
the many advantages to be gained. Indeed, the system is already there if we
will but recognize it.
TABLE 1
State Law Chosen Due 2d Rest.
Process Cite
Cases Ky. Other Yes No Yes No
Batchelor v. Fulcher (1967)149  Y Y Y
Wessling v. Paris (1967) Y Y Y
Story v. Burgess (1967) Y Y N550
Arnett v. Thompson (1968) Y N Y
'9 Although decided very shortly before Wessling v. Paris, it seems fair to
include the decision in the modem conflicts era. There were no changes in the
membership of court of appeals in the intervening period of less than two months.
"' The decision rested solely on Wessling v. Paris.
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Layne v. Layne (1968) Y N N551
Foster v. Leggett (1972) Y Y Y
Cox v. Harrison (1975) y5S2 y y
White v. Bennett (1977) Y Y Y
Lewis v. American (1977) 0 N Y
Santoli v. Louisville (1977) 0 N N
Fite & Warmath v. MYS (1977) y553 y y
General Elec. v. Martin (1978) O5S4  Y Y
Gaines v. Gaines (1978) y555 Y y
Prudential v. Plunkett (1978) 0556 Y y
Arthur v. Arthur (1981) 0 57  Y Y
Breeding v. Mass. (1982) Y Y Y
Paine v. La Quinta (1987) Y y y558
Audiovox v. Moody (1987) Y Y N559
55" The decision rested solely on Arnett v. Thompson.
552 The choice was partial, with Kentucky law being applied to invalidate the
will as to Kentucky realty but upholding it as to Kentucky personalty.
553 Although the contract had a choice of law clause in favor of Kentucky law,
the holding was that arbitration was required under the Federal Arbitration Act, a
result identical to that under Kentucky law. Thus, one may fairly characterize the
result as consistent with choosing Kentucky law.
" The choice of "other" was pursuant to a choice of law clause.
5" The application of foreign law was only to the extent of ordering child
support and a dissolution of the marriage. Other issues were outside the court's
jurisdiction.
56 The choice of "other" was pursuant to a choice of forum clasue.
5' By "other" it is meant that a choice was made to enforce the equitable
portion of a sister state judgment, a position not constitutionally required.
558 While there is no direct citation, there are references in the decision to the
"most significant relationship," the classic language of the Second Restatement.
... Perhaps no authority was cited because the law of the two states (Kentucky
and New York) was the same.
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Bryant v. Jericol (1988) Y Y N
St. Farm v. Tenn. (1990) 0 N Y
Ellis v. Anderson (1995) o 60 Y N
Bonnlander v. Leader (1996) 0 N Y
Prezocki v. Bullock (1997) 0 56 1  Y Y
Snodgrass v. St. Farm (1998) 0 N Y
TABLE 2
Federal Law Chosen Due 2d Rest
Process Cite
Cases Ky. Other Yes No Yes No
Atkins v. Schmutz (1967) Y Y N
Guy v. Citizens Fidelity (1970) 0 N N
Carson v. U-Haul (1970) Y Y N
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Fields (1971) Y Y Y
Bennett v. Macy (1971) Y Y N
Miller v. Davis (1974)562 Y Y
Grant v. Bill Walker (1975) Y Y N
Hinton v. Hoskins (1976) Y Y N
560 Here, the decision to use foreign law was dictated by the borrowing statute.
561 
"Other" is only apossibility. The case involved a forum selection clause, and
the case was remanded for development of a record as to whether enforcement of
the clause would be unfair or unreasonable.
562 As noted supra notes 253-61 and accompanying text, the case is not really
a choice of law case but a door closing case. In dicta, there is exploration of an
actual conflicts issue and speculation that Kentucky law would apply.
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Martin v. Stokes (1980) Y? 63  Y N
In re Velasco (1981) 05 Y N
Kennedy v. Zeismam (1981) Y Y N
In re McGrew (1981) 0565 Y N
T-Birds v. Thoroughbred (1982) Y Y N
Homing v. Sycom (1983) Y Y Y
Harris Corp. v. Comair (1983) s" Y Y N
Harris Corp. v. Comair (1983)67 0 N N568
Kohn v. U.S. (1984) Y Y N
In re Glover Constr. Co. (1985) Y Y N
In re Towery (1985) Y Y N
Blount v. Bartholomew (1988) Y Y N
Johnson v. S.O.S. (1991) Y Y N
Boyd v. LaMaster (1991) Y Y N
WorldSource v. McGraw (1991) 0569 Y N
KFC v. Lilleoren (1992) y570  y N
563 The case was remanded to determine the basis for the transfer. Only one
outcome appears possible, and the opinion makes it clear that if the transfer was
under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, the claim was barred under Kentucky law.
5 This decision was dictated by a choice of law clause.56 This decision was mandated by legislative choice from the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
5  This analysis only refers to the wrongful death portion of the opinion.
567 This decision involved a workers' compensation payments indemnification
claim.
6I This decision made citation to the "most significant relationship," typical of
the Second Restatement.569 This result was based upon a choice of law clause.
570 In upholding the forum chosen by contract, the court relied solely upon
federal law and cited no Kentucky law on the subject. The result appears correct
under Kentucky state case law.
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571 This decision was based upon a choice of law clause.
572 In upholding the forum chosen by contract, the court relied solely upon
federal law and cited no Kentucky law on the subject. There are not sufficient facts
given in the opinion to judge whether the result appears correct under Kentucky
state case law.
51 Mention was made of the "most significant relationship," typical of the
Second Restatement, having been argued by one of the parties.
" Citation was made to Breeding v. Massachusetts Indemnity & Life Ins. Co.,
633 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1982), and to the "most significant relationship," typical of
the Second Restatement.
57S The court compares its result with prior results in other litigation under
Pennsylvania law, apparently governed by the Second Restatement under
Pennsylvania choice of law rules.
576 The actual issue was personal jurisdiction, but the court assumed that a
choice of law clause in favor of Kentucky was valid as part of its judicial
jurisdictional analysis.
Creditors Coll. v. Access (1993) 0571 Y N572
Tatum v. Hunter Eng'g (1994) Y N N573
Sec. Ins. v. Kevin Tucker (1995) 0 N N7 4
In re Phar-Mor (1995) Y Y N575
Owens v. DeClark (1995) 0 N Y
Hammer v. St. Farm (1996) 0 N Y
Rutherford v. Goodyear (1996) 0 N N
Adam v. J.B. Hunt (1997) Y Y N
Vaughn v. U.S. (1997) Y Y Y
Gateway Press v. Leejay (1997) y 576  Y N
McGinnis v. Taitano (1998) 0 N N
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